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Agriculture is a vital source of employment and income for many unskilled workers in South 
Africa. However, due to the decline in the sector’s contribution to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) (as a result of the reduction in agricultural production and an increase in the 
contribution of the manufacturing and services sectors) (Department of Agriculture, 2010), 
this vital role is diminishing. With changing economic conditions and the implementation of 
agricultural legislations, such as ESTA, most farm workers’ living standards have decreased. 
Many farm workers earned significantly less than other unskilled workers therefore, to 
improve their wages, a minimum wage was introduced. However, the minimum wage only 
increased the wages of farm workers who were still employed as many were retrenched. 
Since the impact of the minimum wage on employment and wages has been thoroughly 
studied this paper seeks to determine whether the introduction of the statutory agricultural 
minimum wage, in 2003, restructured the agricultural labour force. The paper will use the 
Mincerian wage equation to estimate the returns to skills (education and experience) in order 
to determine if the productivity of farm workers was affected. The paper finds that 
educational attainment increased for farm workers and was rewarded by farmers, as the return 
to education increased. Experience increased for farm workers as well but was not rewarded 
accordingly, as there was a reduction in the return to experience. Therefore, farm owners 
prefer a more educated agricultural workforce to a more experienced workforce, as they are 
willing to offer higher wages to educated farm workers. Evidently, the minimum wage has 
restructured the workforce to be more productive, but since the same trends were seen for the 
control group, economic conditions also affected the agricultural workforce. The policy 
implications of this are that farmers discriminate against younger farm workers, which adds 
to the increasing youth unemployment problem in South Africa.  









Poverty and inequality are pressing and important issues to many policy makers in South 
Africa. The country is ranked as an upper middle income country; nonetheless poverty and 
inequality are still rife due to policies implemented during Apartheid (Pauw, 2007; Khumalo, 
2013). In 2009, South Africa had a Gini index1 of 63.1 and a poverty headcount ratio2 of 23 
percent in 2006 (World Bank, 2014). Although the Gini index is quite high, indicating a high 
level of inequality, it has decreased from 67.4 in 2006. The same decrease has occurred in the 
poverty headcount ratio, decreasing from 38 percent in 2000 (World Bank, 2014). The 
reduction in these two economic indicators is a promising indication that South Africa is 
attempting to rectify past policies.  
Poverty is mainly a rural phenomenon in South Africa and agriculture is the only employer of 
note in rural areas. However, agriculture is providing an insignificant number of jobs 
(Khumalo, 2013).  Pauw (2007) found that agriculture also contains the most unequal 
distribution of income. The sector had a Gini coefficient of 0.73 (a Gini index of 73) in 2000 
which was driven by the difference in wages between Africans and Whites. In agriculture, 
Africans make up 95.8 percent of the total agricultural employment but earn only 48.3 
percent of the income (Pauw, 2007). South African agriculture plays an important role as an 
employer of labour (Newman, Ortmann and Lyne, 1997). However, it seems that growth in 
the agriculture sector is volatile and low, and has a negative impact on the number of jobs 
available. Many of the challenges that farm workers face are also due to policies that were 
implemented during the Apartheid era, in which agriculture was seen as a capitalistic sector 
where Africans were exploited with low wages (Hall et al, 2013). Du Toit, Kruger and Ponte 
(2008) state that in 2003 the wine industry was the last industry to transition into “the new 
South Africa” as the industry was characterised by white-dominated power, the exploitation 
of blacks, dire working conditions, poor wages, institutions that degraded farm workers (such 
as the dop system3), and an industry that had authoritarian and racist white employers. Du 
Toit, Kruger and Ponte (2008) argued that the relationship between farmers and farm workers 
could be compared to the relationship between a master and his slaves. Before democracy, in 
                                                          
1
 The Gini Index measures the extent that the distribution of income, for individuals or households, deviates 
from a perfectly equal distribution. A Gini index of 0 indicates perfect equality whereas a Gini index of 100 
indicates perfect inequality (World Bank, 2014). 
2
 The poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line is measured as a percentage of the population and 
indicates the percentage of the population that lives under the national poverty line (World Bank, 2014). 
3
 Farm workers were partly paid in alcohol (wine) and partly paid in cash. 
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1994, farm workers lives occurred within the white fences and they were dependent on 
farmers for their livelihoods, such as: wages, housing, water and electricity and, in some 
cases, food and drink. Furthermore, if a farm worker lost his/her job then the farm worker’s 
home was lost as well (du Toit, 1993). It is because of these characteristics and relationships 
that farm workers are among the poorest in the country (Naidoo, Klerck and Manganeng, 
2007). 
Since 1994, the new South African government has attempted to improve the livelihoods of 
farm workers by implementing various laws that affect agriculture, such as the Labour 
Relations Act of 1995, the Basic Conditions of Employment Act of 1997 (BCEA), and 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act of 1997 (ESTA). Ironically none of these were able to 
stem the tide of change so that now farm workers face various insecurities in their 
employment, tenure, and livelihoods. Due to agricultural deregulation, trade liberalization, 
tenure reforms and the lifting of price controls on key farming inputs, costs to farmers have 
increased causing labour shedding or casualisation (Barrientos and Kritzinger, 2004). The 
increase in labour and farm costs have caused the number of commercial farms to decrease 
from 60 000 in 1996 to 40 000 in 2007 and the agricultural workforce to decrease from 
921 000 in 1994 to 628 000 in 2005 (Hall et al, 2013). Labour shedding and casualisation 
have become great problems for farm workers. The shift to seasonal labour was greatest 
between 1995 and 2000 (du Toit, 2004) which coincided with the implementation of the 
agricultural laws, and is seen as the reason for casualisation. The shift away from permanent 
workers has meant that farm workers who were living on the farm may have lost their homes 
as well as experienced an increase in asset poverty and an increase in unemployment. Hence, 
even though there is a move to casualisation, the number of jobs available is still low (Ewert 
and du Toit, 2005; Hall et al, 2013).  
In addition, there still exists a prominent gender inequality within farm workers. Women still 
earn significantly less than men. In most cases, women are only employed on farms due to 
their spouses or partners being employed on the farm (Conradie, 2003), usually as temporary 
workers who do not receive the benefits that permanent staff would receive. Furthermore, it 
has been argued that the wage difference was justified since men perform more physically 
demanding jobs, such as irrigation, spadework, and operating heavy machinery. On the other 
hand, women perform less physically demanding jobs such as packing and sorting of fruit. 
Aside from the types of jobs that men and women perform, there seems to be an underlying 
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psychological view by women, who think that it is irrational for men to perform the same 
work women do, as it would affect the men’s self-worth (Kritzinger and Vorster, 1996).  
Evidently, the agricultural laws have not been successful in reducing the wage gap between 
Whites and Africans in agriculture. Therefore, the minimum wage was introduced, as a 
method for reducing poverty (Development Policy Research Unit, 2008). However, the 
implementation of a minimum wage is a controversial topic, as wages are increased at the 
cost of employment (Card and Krueger, 1993; Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix, 2012), leading to 
two situations: workers who are still employed and earning a higher wage; and workers who 
were previously employed but are no longer. In South Africa minimum wages are 
implemented sectorally and were first introduced in the Contract Cleaning sector in 1999 
(Bhorat, Kanbur and Mayet, 2013). The minimum wage in agriculture was introduced in 
2003 and has created a wealth of studies. Conradie (2003) found that job creation of 
permanent workers slowed-down. Murray and van Walbeek (2007) concluded that both 
farmers and farm workers bear the costs of the minimum wage and Bhorat, Kanbur and 
Stanwix (2012) found that wages increased, while employment decreased.  
Therefore, this paper adds to existing literature by determining if the introduction of the 
statutory agricultural minimum wage, in 2003, restructured the agricultural labour force and, 
if so, how. The Mincer (1974a) wage equation will be used to determine the impact of the 
minimum wage on the return to skills (education and experience) - in order to determine the 
impact on productivity - using the PALMS dataset. This is interesting as there have been no 
studies conducted on whether agricultural employers retained higher skilled farm workers 
after the minimum wage was introduced, as labour shedding had occurred. Furthermore, the 
effect on skills (education and experience) is important as productivity is one of the key 
driving forces of economic growth, which increases living standards and affects business 
cycles, inflation, exchange rates and other macroeconomic variables (Khan et al, 2010).   
The paper focusses on six provinces - Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-
Natal, Mpumalanga, and Limpopo – as these provinces have the most agricultural 
households4 (Statistics South Africa, 2014a). Even though the Western Cape has a small 
percentage of agricultural households, 5.2 percent (Statistics South Africa, 2014a), the 
Western Cape is export-orientated and labour-intensive as well (du Toit, 1993; Kritzinger and 
                                                          
4
 The percent of agricultural households is used as an indicator of commercial farming as it provides an 
indication of the number of households who are dependent on commercial farming for their livelihoods. 
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Vorster, 1996). In addition a control group, consisting of unskilled workers in: mining and 
quarrying; transport; construction; trade; manufacturing; finance; services; utilities; and 
domestic services, will also be estimated to determine if the return to skills of farm workers 
was affected by the minimum wage or by economic conditions.  
The paper is set out as follows: section two discusses two agricultural laws, the minimum 
wage and ESTA, as well as skills; section three discusses the Mincer (1974a) equation and its 
applications; section four provides the data and methodology used in the paper; section five 
provides the results of the empirical model, section six discusses the policy implications of 



















2. AGRICULTURAL LAWS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF SKILLS 
  
2.1 Minimum Wage: 
Statutory minimum wages have been a topic of interest for many studies as there are both 
positive and negative impacts on the labour force. Studies have found that wages increase but 
at the cost of employment.  This section will discuss the theory of minimum wages, the 
agricultural minimum wage in South Africa that was introduced in the Sectoral 
Determination for Farm Workers in 2002, and past international and South African studies on 
the minimum wage. 
2.1.1 Theoretical Impact of Minimum Wages: 
Wages in any labour market are determined by supply and demand of labour. Figure 1 depicts 
how a minimum wage affects wages and employment in a labour market using a partial 
equilibrium model.  A partial equilibrium model is used as only the supply of and demand for 
labour is considered. In Figure 1, the equilibrium wage (WE) is the point at which the supply 
of labour (S) and demand of labour (D) interact (E). At this stage, the economy experiences 
full-employment equilibrium (LE). The minimum wage is introduced at WM and is set above 
the market clearing price of WE. From Figure 1 it is clear that the introduction of the 
minimum wage leads to unemployment as labour supplied (LSM) exceeds labour demanded 
(LDM). Therefore, a minimum wage leads to an increase in wages but a reduction in 





Figure 1: Impact of Minimum Wage on the Labour Market 
Source: Development Policy Research Unit, 2008 
 
2.1.2 Minimum Wage Legislation: 
In an effort to reduce poverty in agriculture, a minimum wage was introduced through the 
Sectoral Determination for Farm Workers and was implemented from the 1 March 2003 
(Development Policy Research Unit, 2008). The Sectoral Determination for Farm Workers 
was first published in 2002, as the Sectoral Determination for Farm Workers: Schedule 8, and 
there have been updated versions of the publication as the Sectoral Determination for Farm 
Workers: Schedule 13. The Sectoral Determination for Farm Workers forms part of the Basic 
Condition of Employment Act 75 of 1997 and provides all labour related issues of farm 
workers, such as: minimum wage (calculation of wages, payment and deductions); particulars 
of employment; hours of work; leave; prohibition of child and forced labour; and termination 
of employment. According to the Act, a farm worker includes: a farm worker; a domestic 
worker employed on a farm; and a security guard employed on a farm to guard the farm 
(Department of Labour, 2013).  
On the 1 March 2003 the statutory minimum wage for agriculture came into effect. It 
stipulated that an employer must pay a farm worker at least the minimum wage to: farm 
workers who work more than 27 ordinary hours of work per week at least the monthly wage; 
and farm workers who work 27 or less ordinary hours per week at least the hourly rate. Under 
deductions, it allowed that an employer may not make a deduction that is greater than 10 



















accommodation or food, housing and payments towards medical aid, insurance, trade union 
subscriptions, bank payments, rent and holiday or sick fund (Department of Labour, 2002). 
Furthermore, the minimum wage was implemented in a two part system. Farms were divided 
into two areas: Area A, where the minimum wage was higher as the area has higher per capita 
gross geographic product and includes wine farms; and Area B, where the minimum wage 
was less than Area A. In addition, Area A consisted of municipalities that had an average 
household income of R24 000 per annum in the 1996 Census and Area B had an average 
household income of less than R24 000 per annum. From 2009, the two part system for the 
different minimum wage levels was eliminated (Department of Labour, 2002; 2006; 2009; 
2013; Naidoo, Klerck and Manganeng, 2007). 
 
Figure 2: Minimum wage increases since 2003 for Area A and B 
Source: Department of Labour, 2002; 2006; 2009; 2013 
Note: All statutory minimum wage increases are effective from the 1 March of that year and are in 



















































Figure 3: Agricultural production versus the minimum wage, 2003-2011 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, 2013a 
Note: Agricultural production and the monthly wage rate are in nominal values 
Figure 2 illustrates the increases in the statutory agricultural minimum wage from 2003. 
Evidently there is a large difference between the minimum wage implemented in Area A and 
the minimum wage in Area B, although both the hourly and monthly wage rate for Area B 
gradually moves towards the same wage rate as Area A.  The minimum wage increases 
gradually from 2003 to 2011. From 2012 there was a sudden rise in the wages: from a 
monthly wage of R1 375.94 to R1 503.90, with the monthly wage increasing by 9.3 percent 
(Appendix I: Table A1). Figure 3 shows a decline in the gross value of agricultural 
production when the minimum wage was introduced however, the value of agricultural 
productions increased as the minimum wage was increased from 2004. Furthermore, as the 
minimum wage increased from 2007 to 2009, so did the value of agricultural production. 
Therefore, it seems that the increase in the minimum wage from 2004 did not impact the 
productivity of farmers. 
2.1.3 Minimum Wages and Employment:  
There is a wealth of international literature on minimum wages. Many studies have found that 
minimum wages led to an increase in wages but also a reduction in employment. Since this 
paper employs the Mincer (1974a) wage equation, it is important to note that Mincer (1974b) 
also investigated minimum wage and was among the first to determine the effects of 



































































wage implementation and found that income did not increase, while unemployment 
increased.  
One study that applies the Mincer (1974b) model is Tauchen (1981), in which the paper 
tested the results of the Mincer (1974b) study to determine the effect of an increase in the 
minimum wage in the covered versus uncovered sectors. The paper found two effects: the 
first was a scale effect in which total employment declined with the increase in the minimum 
wage; and the second was the substitution effect in which low-wage employment decreased 
but higher-wage employment increased. Hashimoto (1982) investigated the relationship 
between minimum wages and on the job training for men in the United States, using the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Men, collected in 1969. The paper found that the 
minimum wage reduced trainings as individuals were retrenched and the remaining employed 
workers experienced a reduction in training due to the increase in labour costs. Card and 
Krueger (1993) studied the impact of the increase in the minimum wage in New Jersey by 
comparing the changes in wages, employment and store prices before and after the increase. 
The changes were also compared to Pennsylvania, where the minimum wage remained the 
same. The study focussed on 410 fast food restaurants and found that the minimum wage did 
not have an impact on employment as the higher labour costs were passed on to consumers, 
through an increase in fast food prices.  
Mincer and Leighton (1981) found that on-the-job training reduced after the minimum wage 
was introduced in United States. Job training was reduced as the training had to be financed 
by the employer, which would increase labour costs as employers had to provide a minimum 
wage and training. Although the paper did not investigate the impact of the minimum wage 
on schooling, the paper found that the rate of return to education increased for low-income 
workers and that the incentive to attain education became higher. Adding to the argument of 
human capital, Flug and Galor (1986) investigated the theoretical implications of the 
minimum wage on international trade and human capital. They found that the minimum wage 
created unemployment for the unskilled labour force as there was a production shift towards 
skilled labour. Furthermore, Agell and Lommerud (1997) found that the minimum wage had 
positive effects on human capital development in the primary sector. The minimum wage 
increased the productivity requirement of firms: firms would prefer to hire more productive 
workers, and created an entrance barrier (a worker will only be considered for the job if 
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minimum education requirements are met). However, this is with regards to individuals who 
had some level of skills.  
In addition to international studies, there have been various studies conducted in South Africa 
that discuss the impact of the agricultural minimum wage on both farmers and farm workers. 
Before the introduction of the minimum wage, Vink and Tregurtha (2003) reviewed the 
international literature on minimum wages. They concluded that many studies discussed, in 
their paper, highlighted that the loss of jobs was far greater than the gain of jobs and that 
some studies did provide some positive effects, such as an improvement in human capital as 
the welfare of skilled workers increased. Furthermore, firms that had unorganised labour 
were more likely to pay wages that were lower than the average. Therefore, the minimum 
wage would increase the dynamic efficiency of firms ensuring that wages were in line with 
the social costs of labour. In addition, unemployment may not have been the result of higher 
wages.  
 
Within six months of the minimum wage introduction, Conradie (2003) investigated the 
impact of the minimum wage. The study focussed on two areas: Worcester in Area A and 
Robertson in Area B. Conradie (2003) highlighted that agriculture had suffered large labour 
shedding for the last thirty years. When employment fell, workers tended to earn more. 
During different times of the year, farm workers earned different amounts: during harvesting, 
farm workers earned more as most do piecework. Furthermore, men were the most important 
for farmers and considered them their “real” workforce. The most significant impact of the 
introduction of the minimum wage was a slow-down in the job creation of permanent 
workers and not a direct loss of jobs. In addition, farm workers had less job security and costs 
increased for farmers. 
In a follow up paper, Conradie (2005) investigated the wage elasticities of wine farms in the 
Western Cape. The paper found that at higher wages, the number of permanent men 
employed was reduced. Furthermore, employment was created if the cost of fuel was 
expensive as fuel is used to run machinery. Conradie (2005) further found that the minimum 
wage had a positive effect on the product price of wine: if the product price rose, farmers 
could meet the increase in the minimum wage with ease but if the product price fell, farmers 
were not able to meet the minimum wage, especially if it increased.  
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Murray and van Walbeek (2007) investigated the impact of the statutory minimum wage on 
farm employment in KwaZulu-Natal. It too found a decreasing trend in employment since 
1970. The study also noted the effects of the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (1983, 
extended to agriculture in 1993), the Labour Relations Act (1995) and the Extension of 
Security of Tenure Act (1997). The Sectoral Determination was expected to change the 
labour structure of farm workers as an increase in wages would incentivise farmers to 
substitute permanent workers for contract or seasonal workers. The paper found that both 
farmers and farm workers bore the costs of the minimum wage, as farmers had to contend 
with higher labour costs and farm workers faced the risk of retrenchment.  
Another study that examines compliance with minimum wage legislation in agriculture is 
Naidoo, Klerck and Manganeng (2007) and was conducted in Makana, Ndlambe and 
Sunday’s River in the Eastern Cape. The study provided an in-depth detail of how the 
Department of Labour ensured compliance with the minimum wage but also discussed the 
inadequacies of the low level of compliance. These inadequacies were that a small portion of 
employers were inspected and there was limited enforcement by the department.  The 
Sectoral Determination 8 increased wages of farm workers, improving their standard of living 
but farmers were still not complying with the legislation. In particular:  the issuing of 
payslips, payment for overtime, working on Sunday’s or public holidays, and deductions. 
However, compliance was higher in Area B than A since the minimum wage rate was lower 
in Area B, a similar finding to Conradie (2003). 
Following the research conducted by Conradie (2005), Sparrow et al (2008) estimated the 
long-run wage elasticities of the demand for regular labour in South African agriculture in 
order to test the suitability of the new agriculture legislation. An increase in labour costs 
motivated farmers to replace farm workers with mechanisation, labour contractors or new 
technologies leading to an increase in unemployment. This implied that casual labour was a 
substitute for regular farm labour. The number of regular workers fell by 4 percent (756 397 
to 728 414) from 1960 to 1990 and by 34 percent from 1990 to 2002. These legislations had 
increased both monetary and non-monetary costs for commercial farmers. The demand for 
labour has become more price elastic since the implementation of the agricultural legislation 
and encouraged farmers to substitute regular farm labour with casual labour due to lower 
wages, lower transactional costs and lowers risk of industrial action.  
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Lastly, Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix (2012) investigated labour market outcomes due to the 
implementation of the minimum wage in agriculture, specifically on farm workers. The South 
African Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 2000 to 2007 was used, with each year having 
between 2 000 to 2 800 observations. Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix (2012) estimated wages 
using a difference-in-differences model, as Mincer (1974a) and Card and Krueger (1993) had 
applied. The study found that farm worker wages increased due to the implementation of the 
minimum wage but, as previous studies found, employment decreased.  
2.1.4 Conclusion:  
Theoretically, the implementation of a minimum wage will lead to an increase in wages but a 
reduction in employment, which previous studies have all found. Although Vink and 
Tregurtha (2003) highlight a few positive impacts no South African studies have found 
similar results.  
2.2 Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA): 
 Although this paper seeks to determine if the minimum wage had an impact on productivity, 
the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) is agricultural legislation that 
also had an impact on the agricultural labour force. It is therefore, important to determine if 
changes to the labour force happened due to ESTA, the minimum wage or economic 
conditions. This section will discuss the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 
(ESTA) by briefly describing the legislation and discussing past studies.  
2.2.1 ESTA legislation:  
ESTA was implemented in order to secure the tenure rights of farm dwellers and to prevent 
illegal and unfair evictions. The Act aims to bring balance to both the farm owner and 
occupier5 by placing rights and responsibilities on both parties and providing procedures 
through which an occupier can be evicted (Hall, 2003). The Act sets out to: “protect 
occupiers against unfair evictions by a landowner; sets out the rights and duties of owners 
and occupiers, which include the rights to human dignity, privacy, freedom and security of 
the person, freedom of religion, belief, opinion and of expression, and the freedom of 
movement; regulates the conditions and circumstances under which the right of people to 
                                                          
5
 An occupier is a person living on the land which belongs to another person (this person is the land 
owner or person in charge). The occupier constitutes farm workers or workers who work in 
surrounding businesses and their families (Chenwi, 2008). 
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reside on land may be terminated; regulates the conditions and circumstances under which 
people whose right of residence has been terminated may be evicted from land; provides 
special protection to occupiers who are over 60 and have lived on the land for ten years or 
more or are employees or former employees and because of ill health, injury or disability are 
unable to supply labour; and criminalises unlawful evictions under the Act” (Chenwi, 2008). 
The Act states that no occupier can be evicted off land that he or she has permission to be 
living on, without a court order. ESTA only applies in rural areas and creates a procedure to 
be used when applying for an eviction order to evict occupiers (Wegerif, Russel and 
Grundling, 2005). 
2.2.2 Previous studies: 
Various studies have been conducted within South Africa to determine the impact ESTA had 
on the agricultural labour force. ESTA was meant to ensure the tenure security of farm 
workers but created many issues, such as unemployment and a movement towards 
casualisation. The studies, below, discuss the impact of ESTA and the reasons as to why 
ESTA was ineffective  
Hall (2003) states that the number of evictions over the period 1988 to 2002 had been on the 
increase although the number of threatened evictions were far greater than the number of 
actual evictions. In addition, in Limpopo Hall et al (2013) found that evictions were taking 
place but without any legal processes. It was further found that farm dwellers had become 
accustomed to evictions as a way of life and did not think of evictions as the generic 
definition of land evictions, as there were a range of evictions, such as: the eviction of entire 
families; destruction of occupier dwellings; evictions of individual family members (most 
probably the breadwinner in order to force the families off the land); and some families had 
managed to secure tenure on farm land but were unable to secure a form of income, through 
employment on that farm. Weideman (2004) stated that farm workers in Mpumalanga found 
that land evictions were continuing at the same rate as during Apartheid. Hence, ESTA was 
not curbing the amount of evictions. 
Roodt (2006) found that ESTA was ineffective due to: lack of knowledge about the law by 
the occupiers; a lack of communication from the state with regards to rectifying the problems 
that arose due to ESTA, collusion between farm owner and rural magistrates, and 
administrative ineffectiveness from the State with regards to ensuring that all legislation with 
16 
 
regards to land reform were met. Hall (2003) provided a different reason as to why ESTA 
was ineffective, stating that it was the judicial system that failed ESTA and that ESTA 
legislation had not been effective in preventing evictions but rather in regulating evictions. 
Weideman (2004) found that ESTA was ineffective due to: implementation which included 
the lack of capacity of the Department of Land Affairs (now the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform); weak enforcement (farmers managed to exploit the 
loopholes of the legislation or circumvent it); and failure to publicise the Act. In addition, 
Hall, Kleinbooi and Mvambo (2001) provided further reasons as to the lack of effectiveness 
of ESTA. First, the judicial system (police and magistrates) did not consider illegal evictions 
to be ‘crimes’ and did not take effective actions. Secondly, legal expertise was required to be 
brought for occupiers threatened with eviction however; paralegals were not allowed to 
defend their clients in formal court. 
Furthermore, organisations such as Sikhula Sonke and the South African Human Rights 
Commission (2003) found that ESTA had been ineffective. Sikhula Sonke, a women farm 
workers’ trade union, which is discussed by White (2010), found that ESTA had led to 
farmers being reluctant to have farm workers on farms when in fact ESTA was meant to 
decrease the vulnerability of farm workers to arbitrary evictions. The South African Human 
Rights Commission (2003) argued that there had been a large number of pre-emptive 
evictions and, due to ESTA being implemented poorly, there has been an increase in illegal 
evictions. 
Hence, from previous literature, ESTA has not been as successful as the legislation was 
meant to be, as evictions increased leading to an increase in unemployment. 
2.3 The importance of skills: 
Aside from agricultural minimum wages, this paper also focuses on returns to skills. Skills 
can be defined as [sic] “acquired fitness (resulting out of training and adaptation) or 
intelligence or any natural endowment which helps individuals to do a job more efficiently 
than other individuals” (Roy, Mozumdar and Kar, 2005) and can consist of education and 
work experience (Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993).  
King, Montenegro and Orazem (2012) attempted to determine if Theodore Schultz’s (1975) 
theory, that differences in the returns of skills are the reason for income differences in 
countries, holds. The paper found that the theory did hold and that private returns to 
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schooling were higher in countries which were more economically free, even when political 
institutions were added to the model. Therefore, migration from economically oppressed 
countries to economically free countries results in individuals earning higher returns to 
human capital.  
Haskel and Martin (1993) investigated whether lack of skills reduced productivity in the 
United Kingdom. The study found that skill shortages reduced productivity and that 
economic growth was not as large as it could have been had more skills been available. 
Furthermore, productivity could be increased by increasing the level of education and 
training. In addition, Roy, Mozumdar and Kar (2005) found that, on average, higher skilled 
workers were more productive than low skilled workers in Northern West Bengal in India. In 
contrast, Irzano, Schivardi and Tosetti (2008) discussed the relationship between workers’ 
skills and firm productivity, in order to assess if workers’ skills were complementary or 
substitutable. They found that having a mix of low skilled and high skilled workers was 
beneficial for productivity and that low skilled workers had a positive effect on productivity. 
Guadalupe (2007) investigated if competition affected the return to skills. Imperfectly 
competitive industries normally generated high monopoly rent, resulting in higher wages. 
The paper found that competition increased returns to skills as employees’ skills were 
rewarded as competition increased. The effect was most strong in industries that were 
strongly unionised and Research and Development (R&D) intensive.  
Bolliner, Ziliak and Troske (2011) studied whether the changes in the wage gap were a result 
of changes in skills and changes in returns to skills in Appalachia. The paper found that 
education and experience were both important determinants for wages. In addition, 
Appalachian men and women suffered from “missing markets”, which was the lack of high-
skilled workers and low return to skills. This has created the wage gap between urban 
Appalachia and the rest of urban America.  
The above studies have highlighted that skills have an important impact on the productivity 
of a firm and subsequently, on the economy of a country. While some studies found that 
higher skilled workers are more productive, there is evidence that having a mix of low and 
high skilled workers is the most beneficial for a firm. However, higher returns to skills are 
found in unionised and R&D intensive industries, which the South African agriculture 
industry is not.  
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3.  MINCER EQUATIONS 
The paper will employ the Mincer (1974a) wage equation to determine the impact of the 
agricultural minimum wage on the return to skills. The Mincerian wage equation is one of the 
most utilised earning functions and can be used to estimate the returns to schooling, returns to 
schooling quality and the returns to experience for male-female wage gaps (Heckman, 
Lochner and Todd, 2003). It is, therefore, important to discuss how the model is applicable to 
the paper. In perfect competition wage is equal to the marginal product of labour multiplied 
with marginal revenue6, the interest rate is the marginal product of capital multiplied by the 
marginal revenue and profit is maximised. Profit is a function of revenue and costs and is 
zero as firms can enter and leave the market. In order to ensure that profit is maximised, firms 
need to increase revenue by increasing firm productivity (Varian, 1992, pg. 216). Firm 
productivity is a function of worker productivity, as discussed in the skill section; however 
worker productivity is difficult to observe. Since firms will be price takers, changes in 
productivity, which is equal to marginal product of labour, will be perfectly proportional to 
changes in wages.  As wages are observable, the Mincer wage equation shows the impact of 
worker characteristics on wages. Therefore the Mincer wage equation can be used to illustrate 
the productivity of workers, and ultimately the firm productivity. 
3.1 Theoretical Mincer Model: 
Mincer (1974a) found that the earnings model focused on the life-cycle model of earnings 
and the relationship of observed earnings with net investments in human capital. The Mincer 
(1974a) proxied human capital with schooling alone and disregarded post-school 
investments. 
The Mincer (1974a) model is as follows: 
ln[w(s, x)] = α0 + ρss + β0x + β1x2 + ε    (Equation 1) 
Where:  
ln[w(s,x)] is the natural logarithm of wage at schooling level, s, and work experience, x;  
ρ is the rate of return to schooling; and  
ε is the residual. 
                                                          
6
 w = MPL.p 
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Equation 1 provides two economic concepts: a pricing equation which describes how the 
labour market rewards productivity, such as schooling and work experience; and rate of 
return to schooling (Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2003). The model further depicts the 
relationship between observed earnings, potential earnings and human capital investment, 
where human capital consists of formal schooling and on-the-job training. According to the 
human capital model, education is an investment of current resources in exchange of future 
returns (Heckman, Lochner and Todd, 2003; Fiaschi and Gabbriellini, 2013). As previously 
stated Mincer (1974a) writes actual (or observed) earnings as a function of potential earnings 
less investment costs. Investment costs are the cost of purchased inputs and foregone earnings 
(opportunity cost of earnings lost due to training or studying rather than working) (Polachek, 
2007). 
3.2 Is the Mincer equation still relevant? 
It has been forty years since the Mincer equation was published and therefore, it needs to be 
determined whether the Mincer (1974a) equation and theory, upon which it is based, are still 
relevant. While there are papers which still use the equation, publications using the equation 
have tailed off since 2001. This section will discuss whether the equation is still applicable in 
today’s world. 
Lemieux (2003) provided an in-depth discussion about the relevance of Mincer’s “human 
capital earnings function” and analysed each variable used in the model. The model, which 
consists of the log of earnings as the dependent variable with linear independent variables, 
still makes economic sense. The log of earnings is used as the log function captures the 
multiplicative effects of education on human capital.  The linear formulation of education is 
also still relevant as every year of education has been found to have a direct impact on 
earnings as shown by Card and Kreuger (1992). On the other hand, experience needs to be 
adjusted, by adding higher order polynomials to potential experience; or else the wage growth 
of younger workers would be understated. Furthermore, when applied to recent census data, 
the earnings function did not fit the data as well as the data that Mincer used for the 1974 
study (the 1960 census). The reason for the difference was that experience-wage profiles 
were no longer parallel for different education groups. Overall, Lemieux (2003) found that 




3.3 Applications of the Mincer wage equation: 
Although the Mincer wage equation is used to determine the returns to schooling, the 
equation has been used to determine other effects on wages. The next section will focus on 
previous studies that utilised the Mincer wage equation (equation 1) and will be divided into 
the following categories: returns to schooling, returns to other human capital investment, and 
studies performed in South Africa. 
3.3.1 Returns to schooling: 
Mincer (1974a) laid down the foundation for estimating the returns to education and many 
studies have since utilised the Mincer wage model to determine the returns to education. 
Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003) investigated the returns to education in Austria. The 
paper used the Austrian Mikrozensus for 1981 to 1997 with a sample size of 400 000 
households. The authors found declining returns to schooling, especially for secondary 
schooling and secondary vocational colleges. The largest decline in return to education was 
for tertiary education, with the return dropping by 30 percent from 1981 to 1997. Contrary to 
Fersterer and Winter-Ebmer (2003), Cooper and Cohn (1997) and Salas-Velasco (2010) 
found positive returns to university education.  
Tansel and Bircan (2010) focussed on a developing country, Turkey. The paper investigated 
gender inequality using the Mincer (1974a) equation but provided some insight into returns to 
education. The paper used the 1994 Household Income and Expenditure Survey and the 2002 
Household Budget Survey, and had a sample of 26 256 households for 1994 and 9 600 
households for 2002. The authors found that there were positive returns to education and that 
these returns increased with the various levels of schooling.  
In the following year, Tansel and Daoud (2011) compared the return to private education in 
Palestine and Turkey for the period 2004 to 2008. The returns for schooling were positive for 
both Palestine and Turkey but the return was lower in Palestine. The difference was due to 
Palestine having fewer people with master’s degrees and few job opportunities for such 
individuals. The same results were found for returns to experience.  
Fiaschi and Gabbriellini (2013) inspected the returns to education in Italy between 1995 and 
2010, over a sample of 2000 to 4000 households depending on the wave used. The paper 
went further by determining the effects of different education levels and types of schools. The 
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study found that the returns to education had not changed over the investigated period, 
however more years of schooling lead to a greater wage return.  
Liao and Zhao (2013) investigated the returns to education for disabled people in China, who 
are rarely economically discussed, while controlling for education. The paper established that 
disabled people in rural areas have a lower return to education than in urban areas. This is 
understandable as the level of education is higher in urban areas. Furthermore, disabled 
people who live in urban areas experienced a negligible return to education. This occurred as 
they require more needs which reduced their level of income.  
With the above papers stating that education increases wages, Jones (2001) investigated 
whether educated workers were really more productive than less educated workers. 
Productivity was measured by workers’ earnings’.  The data used is from the panel survey of 
Ghanaian manufacturing firms over 1992 and 1994 and had a sample size of 1 211. The paper 
found that there was a positive correlation between education and productivity, indicating 
that more educated workers were more productive, and that firms pay employees according to 
productivity. Similarly, Cooper and Cohn (1997) found that investments in human capital 
(such as education) increased the productivity of an individual. 
3.3.2 Returns of other human capital investment: 
While there have been a number of studies done on returns to education, there have been 
equally the same amount completed on the returns to productivity. Stanley (1982) 
investigated whether a student labour force (students working while studying) had an impact 
on post-enrolment wage rates. The study used data from the National Longitudinal Survey, 
from the United States of America (US), from 1966 to 1971 and had a sample size of 5 000 
individuals. The paper found that students who worked while studying had access to financial 
aid and job experience which led to more productive and higher-paying jobs after they left 
university.  
In another paper, Vijverberg (1986) examined the wage difference between market and self-
employment in Malaysia, using the Malaysian Family Life Survey (MFLS) of 1976. The 
sample size was 871 households. The author found that the accumulation of human capital 
raised an individual’s productivity more as a market worker than a self-employed worker.  
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As developing countries are receiving more attention, studies focussing on the accumulation 
of human capital in these countries have arisen. Anyanwu (1998) studied the role of human 
capital on the income earnings of Nigerian men. The data was drawn from a survey of 682 
households in six Nigerian states: Anambra, Borno, Cross River, Ogun, Plateau, and Sokoto. 
The study found that human capital impacted positively on income, especially with regards to 
educational attainment and having an excellent health status. 
Bigsten et al (2000) added to the African literature by addressing four policy questions for 
five sub-Saharan countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe). The sample 
size was between 1 900 and 2 600 households, depending on the country being estimated. 
The main aim of the paper was to determine the returns to physical and human capital in the 
manufacturing sector using both individual- and firm-level data over three years. The paper 
found that the returns on human capital were around 10 percent using the individual data, but 
for the firm level the returns were much lower (8 percent). With regards to the returns on 
physical capital, the returns were much higher than from human capital. The authors 
concluded that the cause for the failure of a successful manufacturing sector was the high cost 
of capital and not the lack of skills. 
Sabir and Aftab (2006) investigated the return to human capital in Pakistan at a provincial 
level and tried to untangle the relative effects of education and experience. The paper used 
the Labour Force Survey of 1990 to 1991 and employed the Mincer (1974a) wage equation. 
The paper found that both education and experience were positive indicating that if an 
individual had no schooling and no experience it would hinder his/her career movements.  
From another African perspective, Nordman and Roubaud (2009) investigated the gender 
wage gap in Madagascar in 1998 and determined the return to experience. The paper used the 
National Institute of Statistics (INSTAT), sampling 2 403 individuals, and found that the 
return to actual experience decreased for women and increased for men. This indicated that 
potential experience is overestimated for women.  
3.3.3 South African studies using the Mincer equation: 
The Mincer wage equation has been used in a number of international labour studies but only 
a small number of South African papers have used the equation. Schultz and Mwabu (1996) 
investigated pre-1994 data, using the 1993 Project for Statistics on Living Standards and 
Development (PSLSD) with a sample size of 43 974, in order to determine if the education 
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Africans received distorted their marginal wage and affected future levels as the supply of 
educated Africans increased. The study found that private wage returns, for Africans, were 
twice as high as Whites in 1993. In addition, ability and higher education were complements 
for whites as the returns to higher education increased significantly, from 9 percent to 18 
percent. In a follow up study, Schultz and Mwabu (1998) quantified the impact South African 
unions had on the distribution of economic welfare using the 1993 population data collected 
by the South African Labour and Development Research Unit (SALDRU). The sample size 
was 653. The study concluded that union membership increased the wages of African 
workers quite substantially (145 percent) whereas for white workers, union premiums were 
quite low (21 percent). The authors explained that while the wages of Africans increased 
from a low income bracket to a higher income bracket, Whites remained within the high 
income bracket. Schultz and Mwabu (2000) continued their work from 1996 by determining 
the wage premiums associated with educational investments and how wages vary between 
race and gender. The authors used the same data from the 1996 study and had a sample size 
of 25 569. Since many Africans sampled in the study did not have a high level of education, 
those who had primary, secondary or tertiary education had higher returns than any other 
race. The study found that the returns to education increased with the level of education 
(which is in line with similar research) and decreased with the average educational attainment 
of the race and gender group. Therefore, the returns to higher education for Whites decreased 
as many Whites had a higher education. The paper suggested increasing the admission 
requirements for higher education so that there is a reduction in whites who attain a higher 
education and the average wage return for Matriculants would increase. For Africans, more 
education and more Africans attaining a higher education will lead to an increase in education 
quality or an increase in any additional marketable skills.  
Bhorat (2000) investigated wage trends in South Africa using the 1995 October Household 
Survey and investigated wage trends from various aspects, including the gender wage gap 
and race wage gap. The author estimated two models, one for skilled workers and another for 
unskilled workers, to explain the role of wages in a skills-constrained high- skilled labour 
growth economy. The paper found a strong race wage gap, and education and experience had 
differing effects on wages for skilled and unskilled labour (although both were positive 
effects). With regards to the sectors Bhorat (2000) found that workers earned the lowest 
wages in the agricultural sector and the highest wages were earned in the financial services 
sector (Table 1 provides the results). 
24 
 
Table 1: Inequality measures for log of wages, by main sector, South Africa 
Sector 90 – 10 75 – 50 50 – 10 90 -50  50 – 25  75 – 25 Gini 
Agriculture 3.04 2.42 2.37 1.6 2.13 2.6 0.79 
Mining 3.7 3.15 2.87 3.63 2.7 3.28 0.47 
Manufacturing 3.69 3.15 2.95 3.6 2.7 3.28 0.56 
Electricity 3.79 3.33 3.21 3.66 3.05 3.51 0.41 
Construction 3.79 3.2 2.88 3.73 2.6 3.3 0.63 
Wholesale 3.7 3.1 2.96 3.61 2.74 3.26 0.67 
Transport 3.71 3.26 3.11 3.58 2.93 3.43 0.5 
Financial Services 3.92 3.34 3.18 3.84 2.95 3.49 0.54 
Community Services 3.64 3.15 3.11 3.49 2.99 3.38 0.51 
Source: Bhorat, 2000 
Keswell and Poswell (2004) applied the Mincer (1974a) equation to determine the returns to 
education in South African using the World Bank’s Project for Statistics Living Standards 
and Development (PSLSD), the October Household Survey (OHS) and the Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) for 1993, 1995, 1997 and 2000. The paper found a strong convex relationship 
between wages and education implying that the returns to education increased as education 
increased. 
Lakay (2007) used the Mincer equation (Mincer and Polachek, 1974) to determine the public-
private sector wage gap. The paper was different from other studies as it switched from the 
OLS to FIML to reduce selection bias and endogeneity. The paper employed the 2002 Labour 
Force Survey, which had a sample size of 7 681 individuals. The paper found that females, 
who were members of a trade union, were less likely to be employed in the public sector than 
men, who had union membership. Individuals with a higher level of work experience were 
more likely to be employed in the public sector. In addition, the paper found that the wage 
differential between the public and private sector was positive and high.  
In order to examine the determinants of the reservation wage in Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain; 
Walker (2003) used data from the Khayelitsha/Mitchell’s Plain survey of 1905 households. 
The study was completely different from previous work as no other South African study had 
used the Mincer equation to investigate reservation wages in an informal settlement. The 
study found that the labour market status had a strong influence on reservation wages. 
Unemployed individuals reported a reservation wage that was far below what they could 





The section has demonstrated that there is an ongoing academic interest in the relationship 
between wages, education and experience. The Mincer (1974a) wage equation is still used 
extensively to determine the return to human capital and is still relevant to use as long the 
environment is stable. Furthermore, there are positive and increasing returns to education and 
experience. Therefore, this paper will use the Mincer wage equation to determine if the 



















4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This section provides the data used, and discusses the empirical Mincer model equation and 
the method of analysis used in the paper. 
4.1 Data: 
The model is estimated using the Post Apartheid Labour Market Series 1994 to 2012 
(PALMS) dataset, version 2 (DataFirst, 2013). PALMS appends the October Household 
Survey (OHS) from 1994 to 1999, the Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 2000 to 2007, and 
the Quarterly Labour Force Survey (QLFS) from 2008 to the first quarter of 2012. The data 
for the OHS, LFS and QLFS was collected by Statistics South Africa. The three datasets are 
household surveys with the OHS being collected on an annual basis, the LFS collected bi-
annually and the QLFS collected quarterly. Due to data limitations the paper will only focus 
on the introduction of the minimum wage in 2003 and will not include the increase that 
occurred in 2013. The sample is restricted to African unskilled workers and who reside in the 
Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Limpopo in 
South Africa and provides a sample of 59 660 for farm workers and 145 897 for the control 
group (the total sample size is 2 200 272). The period of observation is 1994 to 2011. Table 2 
shows the number of farm workers per province. All the provinces included in the sample7 
have the highest number of farm workers in the country.  
Table 2: Number of unskilled workers, by farm workers and the control group, 1994-2011 
Province Control group Farm workers Total 
    Western Cape           20 850            17 224            38 074  
Eastern Cape           15 760              5 643            21 403  
Northern Cape             7 783              7 289            15 072  
Free State           12 269              5 575            17 844  
KwaZulu-Natal           24 905              8 964            33 869  
North West           12 015              3 282            15 297  
Gauteng           24 642              1 237            25 879  
Mpumalanga           14 303              5 471            19 774  
Limpopo            13 370              4 975            18 345  
 
  
                   -  
Total         145 897            59 660          205 557  
Source: DataFirst, 2013 
                                                          
7
 The Northern Cape, Gauteng and North West were included in Table 2 to indicate the number of unskilled 
workers in the provinces. As previously stated (in the Introduction) these provinces were excluded from the 
sample as these provinces had the least amount of agricultural households.  
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Since three different household surveys are combined four problems arise. The first is the 
combined variable for years of schooling is only from 0 to 16 years whereas years of 
schooling in each individual dataset are from 0 to 20 or 25 years (depending on the level of 
education). No explanation is provided as to why the combined years of schooling variable 
was smaller than the unmerged individual variable. A new schooling variable was created, 
school1, which corrected for the error by creating a separate year for each level of schooling. 
Secondly, there was no categorical variable describing unskilled labour. In order to overcome 
this, the industry and occupation codes were used to identify farm workers and unskilled 
labour. In Pauw (2007) and Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix (2012) the process was to cross 
tabulate industry and occupation to identify the unskilled workers. In the occupation variable, 
elementary workers are considered unskilled labour. Thirdly, the data does not capture the 
non-monetary income received. Hall, Kleinbooi and Mvambo (2001) and Bhorat, Kanbur and 
Stanwix (2012) state that farm workers receive substantial in-kind income such as: free 
housing, utilities and transport. Hence, the fact that some farm workers receive non-cash 
income may be a possible reason as to why farm workers earn a lower wage than other 
primary sector workers (Bhorat, 2000). However Hall, Kleinbooi and Mvambo (2001) state 
that farm workers earn a lower income as they have less education than other unskilled 
workers.  
 
The last and most important data problem that arises is wages. According to Wittenberg 
(2014) there are various differences among the household surveys, key of which, is the wage 
data. In the OHS two questions were posed to individuals: the earnings of employees and the 
earnings of employers or self-employed individuals. In the LFS, the two questions were 
merged into one. Later, the QLFS reintroduced the two question format but ensured that 
individuals could only answer one of the questions. Therefore, the decline in earnings from 
1999 to 2001 might be due to the discontinuity of the questions. Similarly, the increase in 
earnings from 2007 might be due to the change over from the LFS to the QLFS. In addition 
to the wage question asked by field workers, each household survey had further wage related 
problems. For the OHS, Heap (2008) found the 1995 OHS data to be anomalous and 
completely discarded it. Furthermore, fieldworkers were incentivised to seek out self-
employed individuals for the 2001 LFS, resulting in more informal workers being included in 
the data than normal. Another problem was that the QLFS did not provide any wage data 
until quarter four in 2009, leading to wage data having to be calculated by DataFirst.  
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The wage data is available in both nominal and real terms and this paper will use real 
monthly wages. In order to convert the income variable into real values, the Consumer Price 
Index at constant 2000 prices was used leading to a deflation of the variable (Wittenberg, 
2014). Based on the above, there should be some anomalies in the wage data, which cannot 
be rectified.  Figure 4 provides the real monthly wage figures for the South African labour 
force. Wages are extremely high in 2000, 2005 and 2010, which may be the anomalies 
discussed above. Furthermore, no income information is available for 1996, 2008 and 2009. 
 
Figure 4: Real monthly wages of the South African labour force 
Source: DataFirst, 2013 
4.2 Variables estimated: 
The variables used in the model are: natural logarithm of wages (ln_wages), years of 
schooling (education), experience, experience2, male and dummy variables for race (White, 
Coloured and Asian). The natural logarithm of earnings (ln_wages) is used since it allows the  
human capital investment variables (education and experience) to be expressed as units of 
time (normally in years) whereas if the absolute of earnings is used, the human capital 




Education is the main variable of interest in any Mincer (1974a) equation and is included in 
the model as education, which provides the years of schooling attained. According to the 
literature review individuals with a higher education levels earn higher income, which is an 
expected outcome of this model.  
With regards to experience, age will be used as a proxy for experience (Keswell and Poswell, 
2004). Many studies calculate experience as age minus years of schooling minus six (Light 
and Uretha, 1995; Bhorat, 2000; Feliciano, 2001) however, this may lead to an 
overestimation of experience (Lakay, 2007). Mincer (1974a) states that earnings increases as 
the number of years of schooling increases but also as age (used as a proxy for education) 
increases (only during the working life). However, the paper also found that the relative rate 
of increases in earnings starts to diminish with age and may even become negative during the 
last decade of the working life. This implies that investment in education is highest at 
younger ages and then diminishes with age, as there is less education attained as one becomes 
older. Hence, experience2 is included to show the decline in income that will occur closer to 
the retirement age.  
Male is also included in the model as it provides an insight into gender discrimination that 
occurs in wage rates. Asher and Asher (1990) state that men earn more on average, as men 
have more work experience and education. This is a similar case in South African agriculture 
where men earn more than women as they are stronger and work longer hours (Conradie, 
2003; Kritzinger and Vorster, 1996).  
Race is included for the same reasons as male, to determine if race discrimination occurs in 
wage rates. Many South African studies have found that race discrimination does occur 
(Walker, 2003; Lakay, 2007) but these studies were not conducted in agriculture.  
4.3 Empirical model: 
The studies in the Mincer equation section mostly followed a similar wage equation, based on 
Mincer (1974a).  
Ln (wages) = α0 + α1 education + α2 experience + α3 experience2 + α4 male D + α5 White D + 




α0 is the intercept;  
αi are the coefficients;  
ε is the error term;  
Ln (wages) is the logarithm of real hourly wages in Rands; 
Male is a dummy variable where 1 is male and 0 is female  
Education is years of schooling with 0 being no schooling, 1 being pre-school, and so on;  
Experience is proxied by age (Keswell and Poswell, 2004), since Lakay (2007) notes that 
using experience as age minus years of schooling minus six leads to overestimation;   
White is a dummy variable where 1 is White and 0 is other; 
 Coloured is a dummy variable where 1 is Coloured and 0 is other; and 
Asian is a dummy variable where 1 is Asian and 0 is other  
The paper runs a pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis to show the cross-
sectional effect of the independent variables on the log of hourly wages. A pooled-cross 
sectional is estimated since the data covers three datasets that are pooled together 
(Wooldridge, 2009). The dataset used is PALMS and pools together the October Household 
Survey (OHS), the Labour Force Survey (LFS), and the Quarterly Labour Force Survey 
(QLFS).  In addition, two groups will be estimated. The first is unskilled farm workers in the 
Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Free State, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga and Limpopo, who 
are the main interest group, and the second group is unskilled workers in the same provinces 
(the control group). This second group consists of mining and quarrying, manufacturing, 
trade, transport, utilities, construction, services, finance and domestic services sectors. The 
control group is included in order to determine if the minimum wage did affect the return to 
skills of farm workers or if there were other factors (economic or political). The model 
discussed above will be applied to both groups and over three periods: before the introduction 
of ESTA (1994 to 1996); between the introduction of ESTA and before the introduction of 




Using the empirical model, above, the paper seeks to find that education for all unskilled 
workers has increased, as access to education after 1994 would have increased, and 
experience will have also increased for both groups. Therefore, both the returns to education 
and experience are expected to increase as farmers will retain their productive labour force 
and reward the farm labour force accordingly. Furthermore, based on the findings of 
Kritzinger and Vorster (1996), returns to being male will decrease, as women will earn, at 
least, the minimum wage. Therefore, the return to being female will increase and there may 
be a decline in gender discrimination. Concerning race, Whites will continue to earn more 
than the other race groups, as studies (Walker, 2003; Lakay, 2007) have found that race 



















5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The key question to be considered is whether and how the introduction of the statutory 
agricultural minimum wage, in 2003, affected the farm labour force. For comparison, a group 
of unskilled workers was defined as all unskilled workers in the following economic 
industries: mining and quarrying, manufacturing, utilities, transport, trade, construction, 
services and domestic service. In addition, a third group – general labour force – was 
estimated as well to determine if changes also occurred in the entire labour force. First, the 
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the paper will be discussed. Thereafter, the 
kernel distributions for the groups will be presented followed by a discussion of employment 
changes, changes in school and age and a discussion of the regression results. This will 
enable the determination of the impact that the minimum wage had on the productivity of the 
farm labour force. Finally, the quality of the data will be discussed. 
5.1 Descriptive statistics: 
Tables 3 to 5 provides the descriptive statics for farm workers and the control group 
(unskilled non-agricultural workers) in the Western Cape, Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, 
Free State, Mpumalanga and Limpopo. The sample size is 59 660 for farm workers and 145 
897 for the control group over the period 1994 to 2011.  
Table 3: Unskilled workers per industry 
Industry Occupation: Elementary 
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 59 660 
Mining and quarrying 4 811 
Manufacturing 20 612 
Utilities 902 
Construction 13 729 
Trade 52 774 
Transport 5 897 
Finance 10 530 
Services 26 536 
Domestic Services 10 106 
Total 205 557 
Source: DataFirst, 2013 
 
As mentioned in Section 4, unskilled workers in the PALMS dataset are found in the 
occupation variable as elementary workers. Unskilled workers were mostly in the agriculture, 
hunting, forestry and fishing industry and the trade industry. Table 3 also shows that there 
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was a small portion of unskilled mining workers within the dataset and may be due to the 
OHS, LFS and QLFS surveys not covering mining locations adequately. It seems that the 
surveys did not cover areas where most unskilled workers were located as the portion of the 
sample size that is unskilled is only 9.34 percent. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for farm workers and control group 
  Farm workers Control  ANOVA 
 Variables Mean Std. Dev Mean Std. Dev 
Male (1=male; 0=female) 0.62 0.49 0.53 0.5 1 089.25* 
Experience 35.72 11.74 38.23 11.51 1 530.00* 
Education 6.45 4.05 8.93 4.15 10 619.17* 
Hours worked 47.9 12.94 43.06 16.67 3135.44* 
Nominal wages 840.23 2 421.98 1 776.64 11 238.40 238.29* 
Real wages 665.99 1 513.1 1 283.96 11 064.95 108.82* 
No schooling 0.18 0.39 0.09 0.28 3139.95* 
Primary (1996 onwards) 0.48 0.5 0.31 0.47 3 998.53* 
Primary (1994 and 1995) 0.10 0.29 0.05 0.21 1 486.65* 
Secondary 0.26 0.44 0.40 0.49 2 875.93* 
Matric 0.05 0.21 0.15 0.36 3 771.70* 
Degree 4.81E-04 0.02 1.25E-03 0.04 19.27* 
Postgraduate 2.30E-04 0.02 5.69E-04 0.02 7.87* 
Real weekly wages 189.15 504.67 375.48 3 516.72 34.28* 
Real hourly wages 4.2 11.22 8.34 78.15 34.28* 
Source: DataFirst, 2013 
Note: * indicates that the F-test is rejected at a 5 percent level of significance. 
Table 4 consists of ANOVA tables that were performed on each variable for farm workers 
and the control group. For each variable the F-test is rejected indicating that the variables are 
significantly different from each other. Since the descriptive statistics provides a snapshot of 
the data, it is interesting to note that there are already indicators of difference between the 
two groups. To begin, farm workers had 2 – 5 years less experience than the control group. 
The control group was also more educated as they had a mean of 9 years of schooling 
whereas farm workers had a mean of 6 years of schooling. Looking at the mean of each year 
of schooling (no schooling, primary, secondary, matric, degree and postgraduate), a majority 
of farm workers had primary schooling whereas the majority of the control group had 
secondary schooling. Furthermore, farm workers, on average, worked longer hours but this 
may have been the result of farm workers working longer working days due to seasonality. 
Farm workers also earned significantly less than the control group and this provides a good 
indication as to why they are described as among the poorest in the country.  
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It is clear that farm workers earned less cash (excluding the value of rations and housing) 
than any other unskilled worker in South Africa, therefore, it will be interesting to determine 
if after the minimum wage was introduced farm worker wages increased. Table 5 provides 
such insight.  
Table 5: Real monthly income (Rands) for farm workers and the control group 
  Farm workers                 Control group                         ANOVA 
 Year Mean Std. Dev 
Growth 
rates Mean Std. Dev 
Growth 
rates   
1994 567 449.29  892 1221.85  135.86* 
1995 538 360.1653 -5.05 1358 1148.8 52.27 1005.36* 
1996         
1997 707 856.04  1483 1702.51  159.80* 
1998 706 3157.04 -0.08 1768 7115.28 19.19 12.21* 
1999 797 3260.97 11.37 3302 48248.3 86.81 3.15ƚ 
2000 628 1164.89 -26.81 2124 39025.37 -35.66 2.89ƚ 
2001 560 457.33 -12.11 1078 1543.04 -49.26 298.77ƚ 
2002 546 383.41 -2.57 1053 880.39 -2.34 841.88* 
2003 573 364.87 4.69 995 902.38 -5.51 560.55* 
2004 628 401.78 8.77 1057 1033.52 6.27 477.33* 
2005 709 426.34 11.37 1031 1051.66 -2.51 253.78* 
2006 716 414.79 0.90 1084 1040.22 5.15 360.27* 
2007 763 571.05 6.25 1119 1044.01 3.27 299.82* 
2008         
2009         
2010 854 4342.5  1411 3129.63  55.88 
2011 799 1087.99 -6.81 1327 2215.46 -5.97 129.08* 
Average 673 1180 -1 1405 7420 6   
Source: DataFirst, 2013 
Note: * indicates significance at 5%; ƚ indicates significance at 10%. 
Table 5 provides the ANOVA results for real monthly wages. No income information is 
available for 1996, 2008 and 2009 (as discussed in Section 4). Real monthly wages for the 
control group increased over the years at an average growth rate of 6 percent. On the other 
hand, the wages received by farm workers was quite erratic. Wages were constantly 
fluctuating and may have been a result of the type of data collected. However, it is clear that 
from 2002, the mean of the monthly wages for farm workers were increasing. 
The descriptive statistics has brought some insight into farm workers’ wages and skills. There 
is an indication that farm workers earned less and are less educated than the control group, 
although both groups consist of experienced workers. Since 2003 there has been a significant 
increase in the wages earned by farm workers, most likely due to the introduction of the 
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minimum wage, as Conradie (2003) found that there was compliance with the minimum 
wage legislation.  
5.2 Empirical results and discussion: 
The empirical results provide greater insight, by determining whether and how the 
introduction of the statutory agricultural minimum wage, in 2003, affected the farm labour 
force. The results will provide insight into three periods: before the introduction of ESTA 
(1994 to 1996); between ESTA and the minimum wage (1997 to 2002); and after the 
introduction of the minimum wage (2003 to 2011). 
Kernel distributions for farm workers, the control group and the general labour were analysed 
to determine the impact of the introduction of ESTA and the statutory minimum wage of the 
logarithm of real hourly wages, education and experience, where age is used as a proxy 
(Keswell and Poswell, 2004; Lakay, 2007). The kernel distributions are used to determine if 
the distributions narrowed after the introduction of ESTA and the minimum wage, and if the 
distributions narrowed across wages, education and experience. Each kernel distribution was 
not normally distributed using the Jacque-Bera test, as the null hypothesis was rejected at a 5 
percent level of significance. However, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test performed on each 
kernel density indicated that distributions were unequal between all years and groups 
(Appendix I: Table A2). Figure 5 provides the kernel distributions of experience for the 
control group, farm workers, and the general labour force8. For the control group the 
experience distributions for between ESTA and the minimum wage and after the minimum 
wage were widening slightly, indicating that the unskilled workforce became slightly 
younger. The kernel distributions for farm workers showed that there was barely a discernible 
movement in the between and after distributions. The level of experience for farm workers 
has increased slightly implying that farmers choose to retain or employ farm workers who 
were older and had more farming experience. This fits the hypothesis that farmers have 
stopped hiring rather than started to retrench existing workers when the statutory minimum 
wage for agriculture came into effect in 2003. 
Figure 6 illustrates the kernel distributions for education. In both the control and farm worker 
groups, there was a rightward movement of the after distribution indicating that unskilled 
                                                          
8
 The general labour force consists of the working age population who are employed, unemployed and 




workers attained a higher education in the period after 2003, compared to the previous two 
periods. In contrast, while there was no movement in the after distribution of the general 
labour force, the density for the years of education increased. This implies that the general 
labour force has become more educated since 2003. Looking specifically at farm workers, the 
after distribution has slightly widened in comparison to the before and between distributions, 
indicating that while educational attainment has increased among farm workers, many farm 
workers still have a basic level of schooling only. Although education has increased for both 
groups there were still a large number of farm workers who had little – to no - education, in 
comparison to the control group. Therefore, education has increased in South Africa over the 
past 13 years but non-agricultural unskilled workers still have a higher level of education than 
farm workers in the provinces of interest. The difference in education levels can be attributed 
to challenges that rural schools face (lack of basic infrastructure, such as sanitation and water; 
roads; and transport, and multi-grade classrooms) (Department of Basic Education, 2012).  
Figure 7 provides the kernel distributions for the logarithm of real hourly wages (ln_wages) 
for the control group, farm workers, and the general labour force. For the control group, a 
minimal movement occurs after 2003, as the after distribution maintains the same shape as 
the before kernel distribution and has a slight rightward movement. The slight rightward 
movement implies that there was a small increase in the real wages for non-agricultural 
unskilled workers. A very different result was seen for the farm workers. The before and 
between distributions remain relatively the same, whereas the after distribution has narrowed 
indicating that the minimum wage has caused an unprecedented narrowing of the wage 
distribution. The density of the after distribution has also increased showing that farm 
workers were earning more than before the minimum wage was implemented, however the 
minimum wage has now become the maximum wage9. Furthermore, in all three distributions, 
the distribution for farm workers was much narrower than the control group. This indicates 
that the highest paid farm worker still earns less than the highest paid unskilled worker in the 
non-agricultural sectors included in the study. 
The kernel distributions showed that the distribution of the log of wages has narrowed, while 
the distributions of experience and education have kept similar distributions after the 
introduction of the agricultural minimum wage, for farm workers. This means that the 
resultant wage distribution within agriculture was affected by the introduction of the statutory 
                                                          
9
 This is based on the standard deviation decreasing from 1.012, after the implementation of ESTA, to 0.949, 
after the implementation of the minimum wage. 
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minimum wage rather than by a change in the underlying determinants of it (i.e. experience 
and education). Furthermore, due to the level of experience remaining the same for farm 
workers, there was no obvious effect of the minimum wage on the age structure. Therefore, 
farmers did discriminate against younger workers. On the other hand, education increased for 
farm workers, which may indicate that farmers discriminated against farm workers who were 
less educated. However, the same result was seen for the control group. 
These findings lead to the next and main hypothesis of whether farmers are paying productive 
and unproductive workers equally or has the introduction of the minimum wage led to the 


























Figure 5: Kernel distributions for experience before ESTA, between ESTA and the minimum wage, and after the minimum wage 
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Figure 6: Kernel distributions for education before ESTA, between ESTA and the minimum wage, and after the minimum wage 
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Figure 7: Kernel distributions for the logarithm of real hourly wages before ESTA, between ESTA and the minimum wage, and after the minimum wage  
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Many studies (Sparrow et al, 2008; Bhorat, Kanbur and Stanwix, 2012) have stated that the 
introduction of ESTA and the minimum wage led to a decline in employment of farm 
workers, as well as increased casualisation within the farm labour force. However, little has 
been discussed about whether the decline in employment numbers is solely due to 
agricultural legislation or to business cycles. Figure 8 provides the employment figures for 
the general labour force along with the business cycle, using an index. 
 
Figure 8: Total employment for non-agricultural workers and the business cycle for 1994-2012 
Source: South African Reserve Bank, 2014 
The Coincident Indicator is used to illustrate the business cycle for the period 1994 to 2012, 
as the indicator provides the current movement of the business cycle. The business cycle is 
plotted with the total employment for non-agricultural workers in order to determine if 
employment movements were related to changes in the economy.  The graph indicates that 
employment is lagging the business cycle, which is expected. Close to 1996, the economy 
reached a peak and then moved towards a recession until mid-2000. Thereafter, the economy 
moved into an upward swing until mid-2008. Total employment decreased from 1994 to mid-
2011. The increase in employment is only seen almost 3 years after the economy moved into 










































































































































Figure 9: Employment in Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 
Source: Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2013b 
Since, Figure 8 clearly indicates that total non-agricultural employment is affected by the 
economy, it is important to determine whether employment movements in agriculture were 
due to agricultural legislation or solely economic conditions. Figure 9 provides the 
employment figures for agricultural workers in all provinces over the six years. There was a 
steady rise in agricultural workers between 1995 and 2002 (2.07 percentage change), which 
contradicts the general labour force movement. However, a drastic fall in employment 
between 2002 and 2005 is hypothesised to be the result of ESTA and the statutory minimum 
wage. The reason that this is hypothesised is due to the introduction of ESTA in 1997 and the 
minimum wage in 2003 and there would be an expectation of a sudden and large decrease 
due to farmers attempting to reduce labour costs and employ casual rather than full-time or 
seasonal workers. The number of agricultural workers by race is also illustrated. In all three 
race groups, the number of farm workers decreased, albeit by a small number, between 1994 
and 1996. Based on Figure 8, the economy and employment were growing between 2002 and 
2005; therefore the decline in agricultural employment may be attributed to introduction of 
the minimum wage in 2003.  
Hence, the minimum wage reduced employment of farm workers, however it is still unclear 
how ESTA and the minimum wage affected the level of education and experience, in order to 
determine if there was an impact on the productivity of the labour force. ANOVA tables are, 
therefore, used to determine the relationship between casualisation, education, experience, 


















































variability in the y-variable is explained or not explained by the x-variable (Wooldridge, 
2009). Table 6 provides the ANOVA results for each variable and for farm workers, the 
control group, and the general labour force for before ESTA, between ESTA and the 






















    
Unskilled    
Casualisation10 47.31 49.65 47.32 148.43* Casualisation 626.93* 425.39* 1863.90* 
Education 5.63 5.98 6.8 308.74* Education 1042.83* 2445.88* 6615.40* 
Experience 35.6 34.91 36.05 41.78* Experience 140.02* 644.47* 708.67* 
Wage (R/month) 552.83 617.02 716.28 29.35* Wage (R/month) 869.21* 18.13* 905.87* 
 
    
    
 
    
    
Control group 
    
    
Casualisation  42.09 45.69 42.60 268.96*     
Education 8.20 8.39 9.10 318.96*     
Experience 38.00 38.34 38.20 2.31ƚ     
Wage 
(R/month)11 
1122.35 1568.94 1205.20 5.91* 
    
 
    
    
 
    
    
General labour 
force    
  
  
Casualisation 21.07 45.82 43.42 75880.89*     
Education 9.51 9.27 9.97 3005.96*     
Experience 35.79 34.03 34.47 755.24*     
Wage (R/month) 2152.67 2199.34 2445.91 5.1ƚ     
Source: Author’s own calculations using PALMS (DataFirst, 2013) 
Note: ANOVA1 indicates the F-statistic from the ANOVA tables; ANOVA2 indicates the F-statistic from the ANOVA table measuring the variability between 
farm workers and the control group. 
                                                          
10
 Casualisation is measured using the number of hours worked in the past 7 days. If a decrease in hours worked is experienced between the periods of interest, then it is 
assumed that casualisation occurred. Casualisation refers to the movement from permanent and seasonal workers to casual workers to save on labour costs (Sparrow et al, 
2008). 
11
 Wage refers to real monthly wages at constant 2000 figures. 
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With the introduction of the agricultural legislation (ESTA and the minimum wage), it can be 
reasonably hypothesised that farm owners would choose to employ casual workers instead of 
full-time or seasonal workers (Sparrow et al, 2008). According to Table 6, the mean hours 
worked per the past 7 days increased significantly during the before and between period, and 
then declined significantly during the between and after period. There is some indication that 
casualisation occurred after 2003. However, this evidence of casualisation applies as much to 
the control group of unskilled workers and general labour force as to the treatment group of 
unskilled agricultural workers. Therefore, the data on casualisation from Table 6 does not 
support the idea that the introduction of the statutory minimum wage for agriculture, in 
particular, lead to casualisation of the farm work force as Du Toit and Ally (2003) concluded, 
but that instead it was caused by more general factors in the economy as Barrientos and 
Kritzinger (2004) hypothesised. Furthermore, Table 6 presents evidence of a greater degree 
of casualisation in the rest of the economy than in agriculture. If a 45 hour work week is 
taken as full employment, agricultural workers on average were employed 107 percent 
fulltime, which is not implausible given the seasonal nature of farm work. In the period after 
2003 this had declined to 105 percent. The corresponding figures for the control group are 97 
percent on average and 95 percent after 2003. These figures suggest that the main effect of 
the introduction of a statutory minimum wage has not been to reduce the hours worked for 
farm workers.  
This is not to say, however, that the rise in the cash wage did not cause a substitution of cash 
for non-cash benefits, as Conradie (2005) had found or a loss of job security for casual 
workers as many commentators expect. The bad news for all unskilled workers is that the 
economic forces that drive casualisation are here to stay and that over time the hours workers 
work will decline. The good news for farm workers is that this sector is experiencing a 
smaller degree of casualisation than comparable sectors in the rest of the economy. Although 
the remaining employment in agriculture is increasingly less secure, there is still a lot of job 
security in the country as a whole. 
Table 6 also provides the mean education for farm workers, the control group, and the 
general labour force. For all three groups, the level of education increased significantly from 
1994 to 2011. Education in the general labour force increased marginally whereas education 
in both unskilled groups increased substantially. Farm workers experienced a percentage 
increase of 13.71 percent from the between period to the after period, whereas the control 
group only experienced a percentage change of 8.02 percent. Therefore, farm workers are 
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gaining more access to education and becoming more educated. However, even though farm 
workers are becoming more educated, their level of education is still well below that of the 
control group and the general labour force.  
Experience, proxied by age, was also increasing significantly for farm workers after 2003, 
whereas experience has remained relatively constant for both the control group and the 
general labour force. Experience for farm workers declined slightly after the implementation 
of ESTA, but then experienced a percentage change increase of 3.27 after 2003. For the 
control group, experience increased after 1997 but did not increase any further. The general 
labour force has maintained an average age of 35 years, which is still lower than the unskilled 
groups. Therefore, farmers are choosing to retain workers who are more experienced, leading 
to a discrimination against the youth. Similarly, the same result is found for the control group. 
The lack of the youth12 being employed is worrying in a country that has a high rate of youth 
unemployment (Statistics South Africa, 2014b). 
ANOVA2 provides the F-test for joint significant between unskilled workers (agricultural and 
non-agricultural) for casualisation, education, experience, and real monthly wages. For all 
variables, joint significance is rejected at a 5 percent level of significance indicating that there 
were no similarities within the variables for agricultural and non-agricultural workers. 
Therefore, farmers are discriminating against uneducated and young workers, preferring to 
employ farm workers who are educated and more experienced. The paper hypothesises that 
since farmers have an affinity to more skilled workers, the returns to skills should be higher 
than before 2003. In order to determine if farm workers are rewarded accordingly, the 













                                                          
12
 Youth employment are those who are 15 to 34 years old (Statistics South Africa, 2014b). 
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Table 7: An OLS model of the log of monthly real wages 
 


























Education 0.021 0.024 0.029 0.037 0.035 0.046 0.086 0.094 0.104 
 
(0.002)* (0.002)* (0.001)* (0.003)* (0.002)* (0.001)* 0 (0.001)* 0 
 
         
Experience 0.036 0.031 0.026 0.053 0.061 0.035 0.079 0.087 0.05 
 
(0.004)* (0.003)* (0.002)* (0.007)* -0.004 (0.002)* (0.003)* (0.002)* (0.001)* 
 
         
Experience2 -3.8E-04 -3.12E-04 -2.65E-04 -5.34E-04 -5.59E-04 -2.74E-04 -7.87E04 -8.52E-04 -4.12E-04 
 
(5.44E-05)* (3.55E-05)* (2.29E-05)* (8.65E-05)* (4.79E-05)* (2.68E-05)* (3.73E-05)* (1.98E-05)* (1.28E-05)* 
 
         
Male 0.153 0.134 0.122 0.446 0.412 0.268 0.36 0.45 0.379 
(1=male; 
0=female) 
(0.019)* (0.01)* (0.006)* (0.024)* (0.013)* (0.008)* (0.01)* (0.005)* (0.003)* 
 
         
White D 0.545 1.475 1.289 0.637 0.865 1.024 0.731 0.851 0.851 
 
(0.212)ƚ (0.19)* (0.130)* (0.092)* (0.081)* (0.039)* (0.016)* (0.011)* (-0.007)* 
 
         
Coloured D 0.263 0.344 0.275 0.093 0.453 0.343 0.115 0.281 0.277 
 
(0.018)* (0.01)* (0.006)* (0.028)* (0.016)* (0.009)* (0.011)* (0.006)* (-0.004)* 
 
         
Asian D 0.27 1.47 0.526 0.529 0.444 0.56 0.468 0.57 0.631* 
 
(0.122)* (0.416)* (0.152)* (0.066)* (0.042)* (0.034)* (0.02)* (0.013)* (0.009)* 
 
         
Hours 
worked 




(0.001)* (4.59E-04)* (3.19E-04)* (0.001)* (4.15E-04)* (2.45E-04)* (4.68E-04)* (1.70E-04) (1.21E-04)* 
 
         
Constant 0.114 0.005 0.26 -3.523 -0.553 -0.267 -1.113 -1.521 -0.97 
 
-0.087 (0.057)ƚ (0.036)* (0.139)* (0.078)* (0.044)* (0.06)* (0.031)* (0.02)* 
 
         
Adjusted R2 0.1084 0.1779 0.1761 0.2247 0.1809 0.1597 0.473 0.4365 0.452 
Number of 
observations 
3877 10374 20304 3046 12639 38933 22354 88889 217463 
F-statistic 10.80* 4.17* 1.22 4.31* 36.11* 25.36* 3.87* 19.27* 2279.89* 
Source: Author’s own calculations using PALMS (DataFirst, 2013) 
Note: Dependent variable is logarithm of real hourly wages. *** indicates significance at 0.1%; ** indicates significance at 1%; * indicates significance at 5%; 
ƚ
 indicates significance at 10%. Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
 
Table 8: Gender wage differential for farm workers, control group and general labour force 
 






























Male 563.32 660.34 744.62 1331.86 2173.86 1351.33 2561.48 2638.11 2824.21 
Female 525.3 550.48 670.79 868.99 979.33 1038.6 1526.54 1658.28 2013.33 
ANOVA 7.85
ƚ
 13.57* 9.39* 127.32* 9.28* 256.43* 195.61* 26.39* 86.57* 
Source: Author’s own calculations using PALMS (DataFirst, 2013) 
Note: *** indicates significance at 0.1%; ** indicates significance at 1%; indicates significance at 5%; 
ƚ





Table 7 provides the regression output for the Mincer wage equations (equation 2) where the 
dependent variable is the logarithm of real hourly wages. According to the table, the returns 
to education have been increasing for farm workers. The period between ESTA and the 
minimum wage showed that one extra year of schooling significantly increased wages by 2.4 
percent. After the minimum wage was introduced in 2003, one extra year of schooling 
significantly increased wages by 2.9 percent. The same increases are seen in both the control 
group and the general labour force, where after 2003 one extra year of schooling significantly 
increased wages by 4.6 percent and 10.4 percent, respectively. Although the return to 
education is increasing in all three groups, farm workers still earn the least for every 
additional year of schooling. This may be the result of farm workers having a lower level of 
education than the other groups. 
In contrast to education for farm workers, the returns to experience declined significantly 
from 1994 to 2011. After the implementation of ESTA in 1997 one extra year of experience 
increased wages by 3.1 percent as opposed to before ESTA, when one extra year of 
experience increased wages by 3.6 percent. After the introduction of the minimum wage, the 
returns decreased further as one extra year of experience increased wages by only 2.6 percent. 
For the control group and general labour force, after 1997 the returns to experience increased 
as one extra year of experience significantly increased wages by 6.1 percent and 8.1 percent, 
respectively, as opposed to between 1994 and 1997 when the return was 5.3 percent and 7.9 
percent, respectively. After 2003, the return decreased as one extra year of experience 
significantly increased wages by only 3.5 percent for the control group and 5 percent for the 
general labour force. 
Looking at the male variable, in the farm worker group the returns to being male decreased 
over 1994 to 2011. The return for the period between ESTA and the minimum wage 
decreased as being male significantly increased wages by 13.4 percent, whereas being male 
before ESTA significantly increased wages by 15.3 percent. After 2003, the return to male 
decreased further as being male increased wages by only 12.2 percent. The decrease in the 
return to gender is interesting and may be due to more women being employed in the 
agriculture sector or to an increase in their wages. Table 8 provides the change in wages over 
the three periods for men and women. In 2003, the statutory agricultural minimum wage was 
introduced at R69 a day and between R650 to R800 per month, depending on the area. For 
both men and women, real monthly wages increased although the percentage change for men 
was 39.18 percent and for women 27.70 percent, between 1994 and 2011. The percentage 
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change for female farm workers is much lower in the control group and general labour force 
(55.88 percent and 31.89 percent, respectively). Therefore, it seems that the lower return to 
men relative to women after the minimum wage is due to more women being employed in the 
farm worker labour force. Similar to farm workers, the return to male decreased for the 
control group over the period of interest. Before ESTA, being male increased wages by 44.6 
percent, while between ESTA and the minimum wage being male increased wages by 41.2 
percent. The return decreased even further as after 2003, being male increased wages by 26.8 
percent. A significant decrease in the return to being male also decreased in the general 
labour force.  
Race is also considered in the model and in all three groups Whites earn the most, relative to 
Africans. However, the return to being white in comparison to African increased in both the 
control group and the general labour force. Only in the farm labour group has there been a 
decrease in the return to being white relative to being African, after 2003. In terms of being 
coloured, all three groups show that the return to being coloured relative to African increased 
between ESTA and the minimum wage. However, after 2003, the return to being coloured 
relative to being African decreased. The return to being Asian relative to being African 
fluctuated for the unskilled groups, whereas a significant increase in the return occurred in 
the general labour force. The return to being Coloured relative to being African is quite 
interesting as one would assume that many farm workers, especially in the Western Cape, 
would be Coloured. However, in order to determine why there is a change in returns, race 
distributions in each province of interest, along with determining if the province has more 
labour intensive activities will have be to examined. Due to the lack of data, this is beyond 
the scope of the paper.  
In terms of the return to hours worked, there is clear negative return for farm workers. 
Between ESTA and the minimum wage, one extra hour of work decreased wages by 0.1 
percent in comparison to 0.4 percent before ESTA. Referring back to Table 3, during this 
period the number of hours worked by farm workers increased. Therefore, as farm workers 
work more hours they are rewarded accordingly. In comparison to the control group, the 
return to hours worked remained positive but decreased as one extra hour worked increased 
wages by 0.2 percent as opposed to 0.4 before ESTA. After 2003, the return increased for the 
control group as one extra hour worked increased wages by 0.7 percent and during this period 
the number of hours worked decreased. It seems that non-agricultural unskilled workers 
51 
 
earned a standard wage that is not based on the number of hours worked, since if fewer hours 
are worked the return is higher, whereas if more hours are worked the return is lower. 
The F-statistic is included to measure if education and experience are equal. In the farm 
worker group, education and experience are significantly different in all periods, except after 
the minimum wage was implemented. This is due to the coefficients of education and 
experience being similar. The F-statistics for the other two groups are rejected at a 5 percent 
level of significance, indicating their education and experience are significantly different.  
 
Figure 10: Yearly regression coefficients for farm workers 
Source: Author’s own calculations using PALMS (DataFirst, 2013) 





































Figure 11: Yearly regression coefficients for the control group 
Source: Author’s own calculations using PALMS (DataFirst, 2013) 
Note: Dependent variable is logarithm of wages; regression model run is Equation 2. 
Figure 10 and 11 consist of the yearly regression coefficients of education and experience for 
farm workers and the control group. Figure 10 illustrates that education has no trend and 
experience has a declining trend. Figure 11 shows that education was increasing over the 
years, whereas experience was declining for the control group. Evidently, farmers were 
substituting experienced farm workers with educated workers, and preferred to pay more for 
a higher education. 
Therefore, the results indicate no casualisation occurred after the introduction of the 
minimum wage, as had previously been considered. Farm workers along with other unskilled 
workers and the general labour force have become more educated since 1994, implying that 
productivity has increased (Jones, 2001). Farm workers, in particular, attained a higher level 
of education than before 2003 and were rewarded with higher wages. Although farm 
worker’s level of education was still below that of non-agricultural unskilled workers. On the 
other hand, farmers demand an experienced workforce as well but were not willing to reward 
accordingly. Farmers therefore have a better skilled workforce at their disposal, after the 
introduction of the minimum wage in 2003. Hence, the minimum wage has restructured the 
agricultural labour force to be more productive. However, farm worker wages are still 
substantially less than the control group, even though their wages have been increasing since 
2002.  In addition, the increase in education and experience is a trend that is practised by 
































restructuring of the labour force after 2003 may be a result of general economic conditions as 
well. 
5.3 Quality of the model: 
In order to ensure that the empirical model (equation 2) was BLUE (Best Linear Unbiased 
Estimator), diagnostic and statistical tests were performed. These include ensuring that no 
heteroskedasticity existed, no serial correlation existed, and errors were normally distributed 
(Wooldridge, 2009). No serial correlation was found as the model is estimated using OLS and 
no lagged variables were used. 
5.3.1 Homoskedasticity: 
To test for homoskedasticity, where errors have constant variance, the Breusch Pagan test 
was used. The Breusch Pagan test for Heteroscedasticity determines if homoskedasticity 
exists by regressing the squared OLS residuals on the model’s explanatory variables 
(Wooldridge, 2009). The null hypothesis is that error variances are all equal (variances are 
homoscedastic). Heteroskedasticity was found in all three periods for both farm workers and 
the control group and was corrected by estimating robust standard errors. 
5.3.2 Multicollinearity: 
Multicollinearity occurs when one or more explanatory variables are strongly correlated with 
one another (Wooldridge, 2009). Multicollinearity was tested for by checking the variance 
inflation factor (VIF), where a VIF of greater than 10 indicates a potential case of 
multicollinearity, across all explanatory variables. Multicollinearity was present in experience 
and experience2. Furthermore, multicollinearity undermines the explanatory power of a 
model by increasing the standard errors, however it is reluctantly tolerated in econometric 
modelling as it does not violate OLS assumptions of unbiased estimators and a BLUE model. 
5.3.3 Endogeneity and Normal Distribution: 
OLS suffers from endogeneity as the explanatory variables are correlated with the error term.  
Testing for endogeneity, across the explanatory variables, was attempted but due to there 
being no suitable instrumental variable for school1, in which endogeneity may occur, the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test or similar tests could not be performed. Endogeneity was thought 
to occur in the education variable as educational attainment may be a result of ability. Due to 
data limitations, ability could not be measured. In addition, tests of normality were performed 
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using a standardised normal probability plot and showed that the model errors for each year 
was normally distributed, N(0,σ2) (Wooldridge, 2009). 
5.3.4 Measurement error: 
Measurement error is defined as the difference between the reported value and the actual 
value (Wooldridge, 2009). A measurement error normally occurs in survey data hence, the 
data may contain measurement errors, especially with regards to income as respondents may 
not be comfortable providing this information and income brackets may then have to be used. 
Another problem may be from the interviewer in that the interviewer will be inadequately 
trained to conduct the interview, and may have placed respondent’s answers in the wrong 
category.   
5.3.5 Robustness: 
Robustness is defined as the model’s ability to perform while its explanatory variables are 
being removed or altered (Wooldridge, 2009). The paper removed all explanatory variables, 
except for education and experience, and found the same result of positive returns to 
education and experience. Furthermore, one explanatory variable was removed at a time and 













6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Agriculture is an important sector in South Africa as it provides employment, especially to 
unskilled workers and can assist with reducing poverty (Thirtle, et al. 2005; Nkurunziza, 
2006). However, due to an increase in labour costs, cost minimising farmers would consider 
mechanisation. Mechanisation options are freely available from countries that face factor 
ratios even less conducive to the use of manual labour than the one South Africa faces. 
Economic theory contends that when the factor wage increases, the use of that factor 
declines, usually shedding the least productive units of the input first. It implies that a number 
of farm workers lost their jobs due to a lack of education or experience.  
The results revealed that education has increased amongst farm workers and that farm 
workers are being rewarded accordingly. However, farm workers still have a lower level of 
education than other unskilled workers and, consequently, still earn less than unskilled 
workers in other sectors. The problem could lie in the fact that rural schools face many 
challenges including being unattractive to teachers; inappropriate teaching methods, multi-
grade classrooms; and a lack of basic infrastructure such as sanitation and water, roads and 
other transport, and electricity (Department of Basic Education, 2012). One way in which the 
government could improve the productivity of agricultural workers would be to improve the 
provinces in which most of the problems occur. Perhaps, the main challenges government 
should focus on is the lack of transport to rural schools and the inadequate supply of material 
resources (textbooks and books). This may create better-educated rural residents who have 
the opportunity to exit agriculture for more highly paid sectors.  
The problem of youth unemployment is well documented (Mayer, 2011). The results showed 
that youth unemployment is prevalent in agriculture too. Farmers prefer experienced workers, 
between the ages of 34 to 36 years, and do not want to employ youth (between the ages of 15 
to 34). Unfortunately, none of the government’s many youth unemployment programmes are 
located in rural areas or provide any career development in agriculture. However, a 
programme that government can expand is the youth wage subsidy (the Employment Tax 
Incentive Act No. 26 of 2013). Government can assist farmers by creating a tax incentive for 
the employment of young farm workers. However, farmers may retrench older farm workers 





In development economics, a number of assumptions have to be made due to the quality and 
availability of the data. As highlighted in Section 3, this paper is also subject to poor quality 
data as the PALMS dataset, which consists of labour force surveys, lacks adequate data on 
unskilled workers and income. Therefore, various assumptions were made in this study.  
One of the crucial assumptions, which informed the analysis presented in this thesis, was that 
unskilled workers were a homogenous class across all sectors of the economy. This 
assumption made it possible to compare the marginal effect of education and experience on 
the hourly wage rate, from which agriculture’s response to labour legislation was deduced. 
For example, it was argued that the return to education of farm workers had increased, 
although the return was still lower than non-agricultural unskilled workers. However, there is 
a general understanding that agricultural along with domestic work is an employer of last 
resort. This implies that perhaps farm workers do not have the same skills as general workers 
in the retail or service or construction sectors but actually bring more human capital with 
them that allow the average worker of other sectors to be more productive that the average 
worker in agriculture. To investigate whether this is the case or not, ideally one would have 
liked to compare the social capital, home environment and inherent motivation of workers 
across sectors. Unfortunately, none of these kinds of variables were available in the PALMS 
dataset.  
The second limitation is that the PALMS dataset consists of a data problem with wages. As 
already stated (in Section 3), there are differing questions among the three household surveys 
(OHS, LFS and QLFS) creating an inconsistency among the income data collected. The 
differing questions mean that in the OHS and LFS individuals may have answered the wage 
question twice (in the case of the individual being self-employed in the OHS) and there being 
no differentiation between employers and employees in the LFS. This creates the problem of 
some employees having higher wages than the average as they were actually reporting an 
employer’s (or self-employer’s) earnings. Furthermore, in 1996, 2008 and 2009 no income 
data was collected. However, the lack of income data in these years had no effect on the 
results as only the years when the agricultural legislations were implemented were of 
importance. Nonetheless, income data in these years could have provided some insight 
especially around the time of the global financial crisis.   
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Lastly, the PALMS dataset does not provide an accurate picture of the number of unskilled 
workers in South Africa. Due to this, there may be an under-representation of farm workers 
and unskilled workers in certain sectors. Furthermore, information collected on these workers 
may be erroneous (years of schooling, age, or whether the individual is unskilled). Most 
worrying is whether farm workers and unskilled workers were placed in the correct group 
(elementary workers). Farm workers may have been erroneously placed in the “skilled 
agriculture” occupation group and skilled agricultural workers may have been placed in the 
“elementary workers” occupation group. Furthermore, this error may have occurred in the 
other sectors as well. This affects the analysis of unskilled workers in the country as some 
unskilled workers may have a higher level of education, experience or wages and may distort 
the unskilled labour market analysis, creating the illusion that either farm workers or 
unskilled workers are more educated, more experienced or earn more than they actually do.  .   
Going forward subsequent waves of PALMS should attempt to do the following: clearly 
differentiate between unskilled and skilled workers; create separate unskilled categories for 
each industry (for example, unskilled mining and skilled mining variables); and to survey 
workers in different parts of the economy, specifically in rural areas and areas not near to 




















Minimum wages were introduced in South Africa from 1999, in the Contract Cleaning 
Sector. Statutory minimum wages now extend to include taxi drivers, domestic workers, 
retail workers, the construction sector and security guards. The statutory minimum wage for 
agriculture came into effect in March 2003, at the end of the summer harvest season, at a 
point in time when large numbers of temporary workers came to the end of their seasonal 
employment. Minimum wages remain a controversial topic, especially in agriculture, where 
the debate of whether the minimum wage promotes fair remuneration and social justice or 
increases unemployment continues (Bhorat and Mayet, 2013). Farm workers in South Africa 
are among the poorest in the country and are in dire need to improve their livelihoods. Hence, 
the introduction of the minimum wage was meant to reduce poverty. However, while wages 
increased so did unemployment as farmers could not afford the increase in wages and retain 
the same amount of workers. This is because farms are also businesses that have the 
opportunity to replace labour with machines. 
This paper investigated whether the agricultural minimum wage restructured the skills profile 
of the agricultural labour force. This is a contribution to South African agrarian literature as 
no other South African study has attempted to investigate the skills (education and 
experience) and the returns to skills of farm workers. Furthermore, this paper makes use of a 
control group – non-agricultural unskilled workers – and general labour force group (all 
skilled and unskilled workers in the economy) in order to determine if restructuring was the 
result of the minimum wage or general economic or political conditions. The main findings 
follow. 
Initially, the paper investigated if casualisation had an impact on the agriculture labour force 
and found that casualisation was the result of ESTA and not the agricultural minimum wage. 
Secondly, kernel distributions were employed to visually indicate if a narrowing of hourly 
wages, education and experience occurred. The kernel distributions for education and 
experience illustrated a widening of the distribution after the introduction of ESTA and the 
minimum wage, indicating that the agricultural labour force has become more educated and 
experienced. However, the kernel distribution for wages narrowed after the introduction of 
the minimum wage, which was expected, as the minimum wage would have become the 
wage floor. Similar results occurred for the control group and general labour force.  
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The Mincer wage equation was also utilised in order to determine the return to skills 
(education and experience). For farm workers, the return to education increased after the 
introduction of the minimum wage but the return to experience decreased. This led to the 
conclusion that farmers, while preferring a more productive labour force after the 
introduction of the minimum wage, prefer a more educated workforce to a more experienced 
workforce, as they were willing to pay more for an educated farm worker. This indicates that 
there was a restructuring of the agricultural labour force as the increase in labour costs led 
farmers to retain the most productive workers. However, similar trends were seen in the 
control group and general labour force, albeit not at similar margins. This, then, implies that 
agricultural minimum wage together with general economic conditions affected the skills 
requirements of farm owners for their workers. 
Lastly, it should be noted that the PALMS dataset is not the best dataset to conduct such an 
investigation, but due to the lack of other desktop data, it is the best. The reason for PALMS 
being unfit is that the dataset does not include a significant sample of unskilled workers, and 
the wage data for some years may be erroneous. Therefore, the quality of this paper can be 
improved by collecting primary data on farm worker and farm productivity. This may provide 
a better insight into the impact of the minimum wage on restructuring the agricultural labour 
force.  
The main contribution of this study has been providing insight into the restructuring of skills 
in the agricultural labour force. Of the various agricultural studies, none had investigated the 
impact of the agricultural minimum wage on the skills of farm workers.  The study also 
discussed and provided policy recommendations for the poor quality of education in rural 
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Table A1: Growth rates for minimum wages since 2003 for Area A and B  
 
Area A Area B 
Year Hourly (%) Monthly (%) Hourly (%)  Monthly (%) 
2003 
    
2004 9.02 8.95 9.91 9.91 
2005 8.95 8.95 10.11 10.11 
2006 4.72 4.68 12.66 12.66 
2007 4.12 4.73 11.67 11.67 
2008 5.27 4.71 10.26 10.26 
2009 12.88 13.00 
  
2010 6.81 6.90 
  
2011 4.45 4.50 
  
2012 9.52 9.30 
  
2013 51.23 51.17 
  Source: Author’s own calculations using the minimum wage increases from the Department of 
Labour (2002; 2006; 2009; 2013). 
 
Table A2: Kernel distribution diagnostic tests for all three periods 
 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test Jacque-Bera Test 
 
Combined K-S Pr (Skewness) Pr (Kurtosis) 
Experience 
   
Control group 1.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Farm workers 1.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
General labour force 1.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
 
   
Education 
   
Control group 1.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Farm workers 1.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
General labour force 1.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
 
   
Log of wages 
  
Control group 1.000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Farm workers 1.000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
General labour force 1.000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 
Source: Author’s own calculations using PALMS (DataFirst, 2013) 
Note: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test H0: Distributions are equal; Jacque-Bera Tes H0: Distributions are 
normally distributed; * indicates significance at 5% 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test determines if the distributions in a kernel distribution are 
equal. For experience, none of the distributions were equal for any group in any of the three 
periods (before ESTA, between ESTA and the minimum wage, and after the minimum 
wage). Education and the logarithm of wages had the same results as experience. The Jacque-
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Bera test is performed to determine if the distributions are normally distributed. None of the 

























STATA do file 
clear 




rename yrseduc school 
rename jobocccode occup 
rename jobindcode indus 
rename jobunion union 
rename hrslstwk hours_worked 
rename realearnings income 
 
//Creating age2 and working age population// 
gen age2 = age^2 
drop if age >65 
drop if age <15 
 
//Dropping missing data// 
drop if educhigh1 == 22 
drop if educhigh1 == 99 
drop if educhigh2 == 26 
drop if educhigh2 == 99 
 
//Years of schooling// 
gen no_schooling = (educhigh0==0) + (educhigh1==0) + (educhigh2==0) 
gen grade0 = (educhigh0==1) + (educhigh1==1) + (educhigh2==1) 
gen grade1 = (educhigh0==2) + (educhigh1==2) + (educhigh2==2) 
gen grade2 = (educhigh0==3) + (educhigh1==3) + (educhigh2==3) 
gen grade3 = (educhigh0==4) + (educhigh1==4) + (educhigh2==4) 
gen grade4 = (educhigh0==6) + (educhigh1==5) + (educhigh2==5) 
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gen grade5 = (educhigh0==7) + (educhigh1==6) + (educhigh2==6) 
gen grade6 = (educhigh0==8) + (educhigh1==7) + (educhigh2==7) 
gen grade7 = (educhigh0==9) + (educhigh1==8) + (educhigh2==8) 
gen grade8 = (educhigh0==10) + (educhigh1==9) + (educhigh2==9) 
gen grade9 = (educhigh0==11) + (educhigh1==10) + (educhigh2==10) 
gen grade10 = (educhigh0==12) + (educhigh1==11) + (educhigh2==11) 
gen grade11 = (educhigh0==13) + (educhigh1==12) + (educhigh2==12) 
gen matric = (educhigh0==14) + (educhigh1==13) + (educhigh2==13) 
gen NTC1 = (educhigh0==15) + (educhigh0==18) + (educhigh1==14) + (educhigh2==14) 
gen NTC2 = (educhigh0==16) + (educhigh0==19) + (educhigh1==15) + (educhigh2==15) 
gen NTC3 = (educhigh0==17) + (educhigh0==20) + (educhigh1==16) + (educhigh2==16) 
gen diplomalessgr12 =  (educhigh2==17) + (educhigh2==18) 
gen dipless12 = (educhigh0==21) +(educhigh1==17) + (diplomalessgr12==1) 
gen diplomagr12 = (educhigh2==19) + (educhigh2==20) 
gen dip12 = (educhigh0==22) + (educhigh1==18) + (diplomagr12==1) 
gen degree = (educhigh0==23) +(educhigh1==19) + (educhigh2==21) 
gen postgrad = (educhigh0==24) + (educhigh1==20) + (educhigh2==22) + (educhigh2==23) 
+ (educhigh2==24) 
gen other = (educhigh0==26) + (educhigh1==21) + (educhigh2==25) 
gen primary = (grade1==1) + (grade2==1) + (grade3==1) + (grade4==1) + (grade5==1) + 
(grade6==1) + (grade7==1) 
gen primary0 = (educhigh0==1) + (educhigh0==2) + (educhigh0==3) + (educhigh0==4) +  
(educhigh0==6) +  (educhigh0==7) +  (educhigh0==8) +  (educhigh0==9) 
gen secondary = (grade8==1) + (grade9==1) + (grade10==1)  + (grade11==1) 
 
//recoded school variable// 
gen school1 = . 
replace school1 = 0 if no_schooling==1 
replace school1 = 1 if grade0==1 
replace school1 = 2 if grade1==1 
replace school1 = 3 if grade2==1 
replace school1 = 4 if grade3==1 
replace school1 = 5 if grade4==1 
replace school1 = 6 if grade5==1 
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replace school1 = 7 if grade6==1 
replace school1 = 8 if grade7==1 
replace school1 = 9 if grade8==1 
replace school1 = 10 if grade9==1 
replace school1 = 11 if grade10==1 
replace school1 = 12 if grade11==1 
replace school1 = 13 if matric==1 
replace school1 = 14 if NTC1==1 
replace school1 = 15 if NTC2==1 
replace school1 = 16 if NTC3==1 
replace school1 = 17 if diplomalessgr12==1 
replace school1 = 18 if dipless12==1 
replace school1 = 19 if diplomagr12==1 
replace school1 = 20 if dip12==1 
replace school1 = 21 if degree==1 
replace school1 = 22 if postgrad==1 
replace school1 = 23 if other==1 
 
//Recoding race// 
gen white = popgroup == 4 
gen indian = popgroup == 3 
gen coloured = popgroup == 2 




gen wages1 = income/4 //weekly// 
gen wages = wages1/45 //hourly// 
gen ln_wages = log(wages) 
gen ln_income = log(income) 
drop if ln_wages<0 
 
//Unskilled workers by industry// 
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gen unskilled_agri = (indus==1) & (occup==9) 
gen unskilled_mining = (indus==2) & (occup==9) 
gen unskilled_manu = (indus==3) & (occup==9) 
gen unskilled_utilities = (indus==4) & (occup==9) 
gen unskilled_const = (indus==5) & (occup==9) 
gen unskilled_trade = (indus==6) & (occup==9) 
gen unskilled_transp = (indus==7) & (occup==9) 
gen unskilled_services = (indus==9) & (occup==9) 
gen unskilled_dom = (indus==10) & (occup==9) 
gen unskilled_finance = (indus==8) & (occup==9) 
 
//Creating unskilled dummy variable// 
gen unskilled = . 
replace unskilled = 1 if indus==1 & occup==9 
replace unskilled = 0 if unskilled_mining==1 | unskilled_manu==1 | unskilled_utilities==1 | 
unskilled_const==1 | unskilled_trade==1 | unskilled_transp==1 | unskilled_services==1 | 
unskilled_dom==1 | unskilled_finance==1 
 
//Interaction term// 
gen school_exp = school1*age 
 
//Agriculture provinces// 
gen prov = (province==1) + (province==2) + (province==4) + (province==5) + 
(province==8) + (province==9) //does not include NC, GP and NW// 
 
//Periods of interest// 
gen before_after = . 
replace before_after = 0 if year==1994 | year==1995 | year==1996 //Before ESTA// 
replace before_after = 1 if year ==1997| year==1998 | year==1999 | year ==2000 
|year==2001 | year==2002 //Between ESTA and the minimum wage 
replace before_after = 2 if year==2003 | year==2004 | year == 2005 | year==2006 | 
year==2007 | year==2008| year==2009| year==2010| year==2011 //After ESTA// 
 
//General labour force dummy variable// 
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gen employed = empstat1==0 | empstat1==1 | empstat1==2 
//separating agriculture and subsistence farmers// 
tab occupation year if occupation ==9211 
tab occupation1 year if occupation1 ==921 
tab occupation1 year if occupation ==6210 
tab occupation1 year if occupation1 ==621 
 
//Table 1 – unskilled workers per industry// 
tab indus occup if occup==9 
 
//Quality of data// 
 
//Robustness// 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured asian if unskilled==1 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured asian if unskilled==0 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured if unskilled==1 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured if unskilled==0 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white if unskilled==1 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white if unskilled==0 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender if unskilled==1 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender if unskilled==0 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age if unskilled==1 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 if unskilled==0 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age if unskilled==1 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 age if unskilled==0 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 if unskilled==1 & prov ==1 
reg ln_wages school1 if unskilled==1 & prov ==1 
 
//Multicollinearity// 
Corr ln_wage school1 age age2 gender white coloured Asian, vif if unskilled==1  





//Yearly regression, Figure 7// 
//Farm workers// 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1994, robust  
estat hottest //Breusch Pagan test. >0.5 do not reject H0// 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1995, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1996, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1997, robust  
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1998, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1999, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2000, robust  
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2001, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2002, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2003, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 




reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2005, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2006, robust  
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2007, robust 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2008, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2009, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2010, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2011, robust  
estat hettest 
//control group// 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1994, robust  
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1995, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1996, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1997, robust 
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estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1998, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 1999, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2000, robust  
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2001, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2002, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2003, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2004, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2005,  
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2006, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2007, robust  
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2008, robust 
estat hettest  
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reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2009, robust 
estat hettest  
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2010, robust 
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1 & 
year == 2011, robust  
 
//new interaction term// 
//In all 3 cases the interaction term is insignificant// 
reg ln_wages educhigh0 age age2 gender white coloured indian school_exp if 
before_after==0 & prov==1 & unskilled==1, robust  
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages educhigh0 age age2 gender white coloured indian school_exp if 
before_after==1 & prov==1 & unskilled==1, robust  
estat hettest 
reg ln_wages educhigh1 age age2 gender white coloured indian school_exp if 
before_after==2 & prov==1 & unskilled==1, robust  
estat hettest 
 
// Original Kernel density test – not used// 
kdensity ln_wages if occup == 9 & indus == 1 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal 
recast(line) addplot((kdensity ln_wages if occup == 9 & indus == 1 & prov == 1 & year == 
1994) (kdensity ln_wages if indus == 1 & occup == 9 & prov == 1 & year == 1997) 
(kdensity ln_wages if indus == 1 & occup == 9 & prov == 1 & year == 2000) (kdensity 
ln_wages if indus == 1 & occup == 9 & prov == 1 & year == 2005) (kdensity ln_wages if 
indus == 1 & occup == 9 & prov == 1 & year == 2007)(kdensity ln_wages if indus == 1 & 
occup == 9 & prov == 1 & year == 2011)) 
ksmirnov ln_wages = (indus==1) & (occup ==9) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
to test the equality of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest ln_wages if occup == 9 & indus == 1 & prov == 1 & year == 1994 //Jarque-Bera 
normality test H0: Normal distribution// 
sktest ln_wages if occup == 9 & indus == 1 & prov == 1 & year == 1997 
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sktest ln_wages if occup == 9 & indus == 1 & prov == 1 & year == 2000 
sktest ln_wages if occup == 9 & indus == 1 & prov == 1 & year == 2005 
sktest ln_wages if occup == 9 & indus == 1 & prov == 1 & year == 2007 
sktest ln_wages if occup == 9 & indus == 1 & prov == 1 & year == 2011 
kdensity ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 1994 & prov == 1) (kdensity 
ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 1997 & prov == 1) (kdensity ln_wages if 
unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 2000 & prov == 1) (kdensity ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 
& year == 2005 & prov == 1) (kdensity ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 2007 & 
prov == 1)(kdensity ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 2011 & prov == 1)) 
ksmirnov ln_wages = (unskillnonagri == 1) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test 
the equality of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 1994 & prov == 1 //Jarque-Bera normality 
test H0: Normal distribution// 
sktest ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 1997 & prov == 1 
sktest ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 2000 & prov == 1 
sktest ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 2005 & prov == 1 
sktest ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 2007 & prov == 1 
sktest ln_wages if unskillnonagri == 1 & year == 2011 & prov == 1 
twoway (bar earnings year if indus == 9 & occup == 1) // Lags in the wage income// 
//Regression by periods – Table 5// 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian hours_worked if unskilled == 1 
& prov == 1 & before_after==0, robust estat hettest  
test school=age 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian hours_worked if unskilled == 1 
& prov == 1 & before_after==1, robust estat hettest  
test school=age 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian hours_worked if unskilled == 1 
& prov == 1 & before_after==2, robust 




reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian hours_worked if unskilled == 0 
& prov == 1 & before_after==0, robust estat hettest  
test school=age 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian hours_worked if unskilled == 0 
& prov == 1 & before_after==1, robust  
estat hettest  
test school=age 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian hours_worked if unskilled == 0 
& prov == 1 & before_after==2, robust 
estat hettest  
test school=age 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian hours_worked if employed==1 
& prov == 1 & before_after==0, robust  
estat hettest  
test school=age 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian hours_worked if employed==1 
& prov == 1 & before_after==1, robust  
estat hettest  
test school=age 
reg ln_wages school1 age age2 gender white coloured indian hours_worked if employed==1 
& prov == 1 & before_after==2, robust 
estat hettest  
test school=age 
//Figure3 - Kernel// 
kdensity ln_wages if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity ln_wages if unskilled == 0 & before_after == 0) (kdensity ln_wages if 
unskilled == 0 & before_after==1) (kdensity ln_wages if unskilled == 0 & before_after==2))   
ksmirnov ln_wages = (unskilled==0) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the 
equality of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest ln_wages if unskilled==0 & prov == 1 
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kdensity ln_wages if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity ln_wages if unskilled == 1 & before_after == 0) (kdensity ln_wages if 
unskilled == 1 & before_after==1) (kdensity ln_wages if unskilled == 1 & before_after==2))   
ksmirnov ln_wages = (unskilled==1) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the 
equality of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest ln_wages if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1   
kdensity ln_wages if employed==1 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity ln_wages if employed==1 & before_after == 0) (kdensity ln_wages if 
employed==1 & before_after==1) (kdensity ln_wages if employed==1 & before_after==2))   
ksmirnov ln_wages = (employed==1) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the 
equality of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest ln_wages if employed == 1 & prov == 1 
//Figure 2 - Kernel// 
kdensity school1 if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity school1 if unskilled == 0 & before_after == 0) (kdensity school1 if 
unskilled == 0 & before_after==1) (kdensity school1 if unskilled == 0 & before_after==2))   
ksmirnov school1 = (unskilled==0) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the 
equality of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest school1 if unskilled==0 & prov == 1  //Jarque-Bera normality test H0: Normal 
distribution// 
kdensity school1 if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity school1 if unskilled == 1 & before_after == 0) (kdensity school1 if 
unskilled == 1 & before_after==1) (kdensity school1 if unskilled == 1 & before_after==2))   
ksmirnov school1 = (unskilled==1) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the 
equality of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest school1 if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 
kdensity school1 if employed==1 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity school1 if employed==1 & before_after == 0) (kdensity school1 if 
employed==1 & before_after==1) (kdensity school1 if employed==1 & before_after==2))   
ksmirnov school1 = (employed==1) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the 
equality of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest school1 if employed == 1 & prov == 1   
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//Figure 1 – Kernel distributions// 
kdensity age if unskilled == 0 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity age if unskilled == 0 & before_after == 0) (kdensity age if unskilled == 0 
& before_after==1) (kdensity age if unskilled == 0 & before_after==2))   
ksmirnov age = (unskilled==0) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the equality 
of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest age if unskilled==0 & prov == 1  
kdensity age if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity age if unskilled == 1 & before_after == 0) (kdensity age if unskilled == 1 
& before_after==1) (kdensity age if unskilled == 1 & before_after==2))   
ksmirnov age = (unskilled==1) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the equality 
of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest age if unskilled == 1 & prov == 1 
kdensity age if employed==1 & prov == 1, kernel(gaussian) normal recast(line) 
addplot((kdensity age if employed==1 & before_after == 0) (kdensity age if employed==1 & 
before_after==1) (kdensity age if employed==1 & before_after==2))   
ksmirnov age = (employed==1) & (prov == 1) //Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to test the equality 
of distributions. Look at the p-value for the last line// 
sktest age if employed == 1 & prov == 1 
//ANOVA Table 4// 
oneway hours_worked before_after if unskilled==0 & prov==1, tab 
oneway hours_worked before_after if unskilled==1 & prov==1, tab 
oneway hours_worked before_after if employed==1 & prov==1, tab 
 
//Table 4 - General labour force// 
oneway age before_after if employed==1 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway school1 before_after if employed==1 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway income before_after if employed==1 & prov==1, tab bon 
 
//Table 4 - Control group// 
oneway age before_after if unskilled==0 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway school1 before_after if unskilled==0 & prov==1, tab bon 
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oneway income before_after if unskilled==0 & prov==1, tab bon 
 
// Table 4 - Farm workers// 
oneway age before_after if unskilled==1 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway school1 before_after if unskilled==1 & prov==1, tab bon  
oneway income before_after if unskilled==1 & prov==1, tab bon 
//Table 4 – All unskilled// 
oneway hours_worked unskilled if before_after==2 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway hours_worked unskilled if before_after==1 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway hours_worked unskilled if before_after==0 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway school1 unskilled if before_after==0 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway school1 unskilled if before_after==1 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway school1 unskilled if before_after==2 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway age unskilled if before_after==2 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway age unskilled if before_after==1 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway age unskilled if before_after==0 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway income unskilled if before_after==0 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway income unskilled if before_after==1 & prov==1, tab bon 
oneway income unskilled if before_after==2 & prov==1, tab bon 
 
//Descriptive statistics - Table 2// 
oneway age unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway school1 unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway indus unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway occup unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway hours_worked unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway earnings unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway earnings unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway income unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway no_schooling unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway primary unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway primary0 unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway secondary unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
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oneway matric unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway degree unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway postgrad unskilled if prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway wages1 unskilled if popgroup==2 & prov ==1, tab bon 
oneway wages unskilled if popgroup==2 & prov ==1, tab bon 
 
//Table 3 – Monthly income for farm workers and control group// 
oneway income unskilled if year==1994 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==1995 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==1996 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==1997 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==1998 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==1999 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2000 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2001 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2002 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2003 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2004 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2005 & prov==1, tab 
oneway income unskilled if year==2006 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2007 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2008 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2009 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2010 & prov==1, tab  
oneway income unskilled if year==2011 & prov==1, tab 
//Table 6 – Gender wage differential// 
Oneway income gender if unskilled==0 & prov==1 & before_after==0 
Oneway income gender if unskilled==0 & prov==1 & before_after==1 
Oneway income gender if unskilled==0 & prov==1 & before_after==2 
Oneway income gender if unskilled==1 & prov==1 & before_after==0 
Oneway income gender if unskilled==1 & prov==1 & before_after==1 
Oneway income gender if unskilled==1 & prov==1 & before_after==2 
Oneway income gender if employed==1 & prov==1 & before_after==0 
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Oneway income gender if employed==1 & prov==1 & before_after==1 
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